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Delgado v. Trax Bar & Grill:
Determining the Scope of the Prior
Similar Incidents Test in Terms of
Efficient Resource Allocation
By CRAIG CRAWFORD*
OVER THE PAST TWO decades, the California Supreme Court's
decisions in the field of premises security have been the subject of
much criticism by courts and commentators alike.1 Perhaps in recog-
nition of this overwhelming criticism the California Supreme Court
recently granted review of the Fifth District Court of Appeal's decision
in Delgado v. Trax Bar & Grill.2 Specifically, the court will address the
following issue:
Does a tavern owner who voluntarily provides security guards to monitor
the tavern's parking lot and control patron behavior thereby assume the
duty to protect patrons from assault by others in the parking lot, or is the
existence of such a duty still subject to the foreseeability analysis of Ann M.
v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center?3
* Class of 2005. 1 would like to thank Professors Joshua Davis, Rhonda Magee
Andrews, and Michelle Travis for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this
Comment.
1. See, e.g., Nola M. v. Univ. of S. Cal., 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 97, 109 (Ct. App. 1993)
(suggesting that "it may be time for the Supreme Court to reexamine the concept of duty it
articulated in [Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hospital] in the context of a society which
appears unable to effectively stem the tide of violent crime"); Onciano v. Golden Palace
Rest., Inc., 268 Cal. Rptr. 96, 101-02 (Ct. App. 1990) (Woods, J., concurring in part, dis-
senting in part) (observing that the "totality of the circumstances" test leads to inequity);
Ann M. v. Pac. Plaza Shopping Ctr., 863 P.2d 207, 216-18 (Cal. 1993) (Mosk, J., dissent-
ing); Julie Davies, Undercutting Premises Liability: Reflections on the Use and Abuse of Causation
Doctrine, 40 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 971, 973-74 (2003); Uri Kaufman, When Crime Pays: Business
Landlords' Duty to Protect Customers from Criminal Acts Committed on the Premises, 31 S. TEx. L.
REV. 89, 90 (1990); Stephen D. Sugarman, Judges as Tort Law Un-Makers: Recent California
Experience with 'New" Torts, 49 DEPAUL L. REv. 455, 455 (1999).
2. 134 Cal. Rptr. 2d 548 (Ct. App. 2003), review granted, 75 P.3d 29 (Cal. 2004).
3. CAL. APPELLATE COURTS, CASE INFORMATION: CASE SuMMARY-Delgado v. Trax Bar
& Grill (2004), at http://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov/search/mainCaseScreen.cfm?dist
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The California Supreme Court should take this opportunity to once
and for all propose a clear, coherent analysis capable of achieving
consistent liability rules.
In resolving the issue before it, the court must implicitly deter-
mine the viability and limitations of the prior similar incidents test.4
That is to say, if the court seeks to determine what the test is not, the
court must first define exactly what the test is. The determination of
the scope of the prior similar incidents test necessarily depends on a
clear articulation capable of achieving consistent results. Although the
court's adoption of the prior similar incidents test was motivated in
part by the desire to achieve a predictable model of liability, 5 the body
of conflicting interpretations, applications, and results demonstrates
the court's failure in this respect.6 This failure was not a result of
flawed legal reasoning; rather, it was a result of the court's incomplete
=O&docid=278570&rc=l (last accessed Feb. 7, 2005). On December 15, 2004, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court solicited supplemental briefing from the parties addressing "the effect,
if any, of the 'negligent undertaking' doctrine upon the duty question presented in this
case" and "the effect, if any, of Taylor v. Centennial Bowl, Inc." CAL. APPELLATE COURTS, CASE
INFORMATION: DOCKET ENTRIES (REGISTER OF AcrIONS)-Delgado v. Trax Bar & Grill (2004),
at http://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov/search/dockets.cfm?dist=0&docid=278570 (last
accessed Feb. 7, 2005).
4. As adopted and modified by the California Supreme Court, the prior similar inci-
dents test states that, in the context of imposing a high burden on the defendant land-
owner, for example, providing security guards, "the requisite degree of foreseeability
rarely, if ever, can be proven in the absence of prior similar incidents of violent crime on
the landowner's premises." Ann M., 863 P.2d at 215.
5. Cf Ann M., 863 P.2d at 215 (noting the court's previous holding in Isaacs v. Hunt-
ington Memorial Hospital 695 P.2d 653 (Cal. 1985), "tended to confuse the duty analysis").
6. See Avila v.Jado Props., Inc., 5 Cal. Rptr. 3d 141,147 (Ct. App. 2003) (holding the
foreseeability analysis of Ann M. is inapposite where the plantiff and defendant contracted
for the provision of security guards during the time of the third party crime on defendant's
premises), review granted, 82 P.3d 746 (Cal. 2004); Mata v. Mata, 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 141, 145
(Ct. App. 2003) (holding foreseeability analysis of Ann M. is inapposite where defendant
landowner assumed a duty by previously hiring security guards), review denied, 2003 Cal.
LEXIS 2701 (Sup. Ct. Apr. 23, 2003); Morris v. De La Torre, 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 568, 575 (Ct.
App. 2003) (holding that, although prior incidents were not sufficiently similar to the gang
attack giving rise to the litigation so as to provide the degree of foreseeability required to
impose a duty to take reasonable measures to prevent future third party crimes on the
premises, the special relationship doctrine imposed a duty on the landowner to take rea-
sonable measures to respond to contemporaneous criminal attacks perpetrated in plain view
of landowner), review granted, 81 P.3d 221 (2003); Claxton v. Ad. Richfield Co., 133 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 425, 433-34 (Ct. App. 2003) (holding that, although there was no evidence of
prior racially-motivated, gang assaults on the defendant landowner's premises, evidence of
prior assaults were sufficiently similar to the instant third party assault to provide the requi-
site degree of foreseeability to impose a duty on the defendant landowner to provide addi-
tional security measures), review denied, 2003 Cal. LEXIS 5454 (Sup. Ct. July 30, 2003);
Alvarez v.Jacmar Pac. Pizza Corp., 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 890, 906 (Ct. App. 2002) (holding that
prior third party crimes on the premises were not similar enough to impose a duty).
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articulation of its sound reasoning in initially adopting the prior simi-
lar incidents test. Thus, the failure was one of incompleteness.
In order to complete the prior similar incidents test, the court
now must identify the principles underlying its initial decision to
adopt this test. The court must then refine the existing test to estab-
lish a predictable model of liability. With the necessary predictability
ensured, only then may the court identify the scope, and hence the
limits, of this test by effectuating the underlying policies the test seeks
to further. Finally, the court must resolve the specific issue before it
and determine whether the voluntary provision of security guards falls
within the scope of the prior similar incidents test.
This Comment provides the California Supreme Court with gui-
dance in its endeavors to complete the prior similar incidents test over
eleven years after it was first adopted. 7 Part I provides a brief historical
context of the development of premises security litigation and the
emergence of the prior similar incidents test as the majority approach.
This section also traces the evolution of California case law regarding
foreseeable third party crimes. Part II discusses Delgado, focusing on
the Fifth District's interpretation and application of the prior similar
incidents test. Part III proposes that the most coherent explanation of
the court's decision to adopt the prior similar incidents test is in terms
of efficient resource allocation typical of law and economics. This part
proposes a refinement to the current prior similar incidents test in
furtherance of the intended efficient resource allocation. Part IV con-
cludes by applying the completed test to the issue currently before the
California Supreme Court, concluding that the scope of the prior sim-
ilar incidents test, as properly conceived, includes those instances
where a landowner voluntarily provides security guards. Therefore,
under the refined prior similar incidents test, a landowner who volun-
tarily assumes the burden associated with providing security guards
does not owe its patrons a duty to prevent third party criminal assaults
absent prior similar incidents on the premises.
I. Background of Premises Security litigation
A. Emergence of the Prior Similar Incidents Test
The law of premises liability is a separate branch of tort law deal-
ing with the liability of landowners to persons entering their land.8 A
7. See Ann M., 863 P.2d at 215.
8. See David H. Estes, Premises Liability for Owners and Occupiers of Real Property: A Legal
Research Guide, in 38 LEGAL RESEARCH GUIDES 1 (2000).
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premises security lawsuit is a type of premises liability where the victim
of a third party crime sues the owner or occupier of the premises
where the crime occurred. 9 In order to prevail, the plaintiff must
prove that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty, that the duty was
breached, and that the defendant's breach caused the plaintiffs
injuries. 10
Recognition of a cause of action for premises security has been a
relatively recent development in premises liability.11 Courts were ini-
tially reluctant to impose a duty on landowners under circumstances
where liability attached to the intentionally injurious conduct of re-
moved third parties. 12 However, in response to the increasing crime
rate and growing public concern regarding violent crime, courts be-
gan to recognize a limited duty for landowners to prevent foreseeable
third party criminal acts.13 The Second Restatement of Torts recognizes
this limited duty and provides:
A possessor of land who holds it open to the public for entry for his
business purposes is subject to liability to members of the public
while they are upon the land for such a purpose, for physical harm
caused by the accidental, negligent, or intentionally harmful acts of
third persons or animals, and by the failure of the possessor to ex-
ercise reasonable care to (a) discover that such acts are being done
or are likely to be done, or (b) give a warning adequate to enable
the visitors to avoid the harm, or otherwise to protect them against
it. 14
In order to ensure that a landowner's duty remained limited,
courts have held that the degree of foreseeability required to impose a
duty could not be established absent prior similar incidents on the
premises. 5 As a growing number of jurisdictions adopted this "prior
similar incidents" test, so too grew the variations ofjudicial interpreta-
9. See ALAN KAMINSKY, A COMPLETE GUIDE TO PREMISES SECURITY LITIGATION 3 (2d ed.
2001).
10. See id.
11. See Kaufman, supra note 1, at 90.
12. See id.
13. See Laura DiCola Kulwicki, A Landowner's Duty to Guard Against Criminal Attack:
Foreseeability and the Prior Similar Incidents Rule, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 247, 247 (1987). The source
of this limited duty is found in landlord-tenant law, where courts had previously imposed a
duty on landlords to prevent foreseeable criminal acts on the landlord's premises. See id.
14. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 344 (1965).
15. See Michael J. Yelnosky, Business Inviters' Duty to Protect Invitees from Criminal Acts,
134 U. PA. L REV. 883, 891 (1986) ("The first group of cases to be considered narrowly
limits the existence of the duty. Unless . . . the defendant inviter knewor had reason to
know that criminal acts posing imminent probability of harm to an invitee were occurring
• . . , no duty to protect arises.").
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tion of the test.16 Some jurisdictions interpreted the prior similar inci-
dents test to require prior "identical" incidents. 7 These jurisdictions
imposed a duty on a landowner only where there was evidence of a
prior incident of the same crime occurring in approximately the same
manner t8 Other jurisdictions interpreted the prior similar incidents
test to require a prior criminal incident.' 9 These jurisdictions held that
evidence of any previous crime on the premises imposed a duty on the
landowner to take reasonable precautions to prevent all future third
party crime.20
B. California Jurisprudence
. California landowners owe a general duty to persons upon their
land to maintain their premises in a reasonably safe condition. 2 1 In
determining whether a specific type of conduct falls within the scope
of this general duty, California courts consider the purpose of the
plaintiff's presence on the premises along with the following factors:
[T]he foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of cer-
tainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connec-
tion between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the
moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the policy of
preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant
and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise
care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost,
and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.22
In balancing these Rowland factors, courts recognize that foreseeabil-
ity of harm is the most important factor .23 Although this fact-intensive
16. Compare Butler v. Acme Mkts., Inc., 445 A.2d 1141, 1143-44 (N.J. 1982), with Mor-
gan v. Bucks Assocs., 428 F. Supp. 546, 550 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
17. See, e.g., Butler, 445 A.2d at 1143-44.
18. See id.
19. See, e.g., Morgan, 428 F. Supp. at 550 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
20. See id. (denying defendant's motion for a new trial and judgment n.o.v. on the
ground that evidence of prior car thefts in landowner's parking lot did not impose a duty
to prevent subsequent criminal assault on a business invitee).
21. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 1714 (West 2004); Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561,
565-66 (Cal. 1968).
22. Rowland, 443 P.2d at 564 (rejecting the rigid common law rule predicating duty of
care on the injured person's status as an invitee, licensee, or trespasser). Prior to Rowland,
a landowner owed a duty "to take affirmative action to control the wrongful acts of third
persons which threaten invitees where the occupant has reasonable cause to anticipate
such acts and the probability of injury resulting therefrom." Taylor v. Centennial Bowl,
Inc., 416 P.2d 793, 797 (Cal. 1966).
23. See Ann M. v. Pac. Plaza Shopping Ctr., 863 P.2d 207, 214 (Cal. 1993) (reasoning
that "foreseeability is a crucial factor in determining the existence of a duty"); Kulwicki,
supra note 13, at 247 (stating that foreseeability is "a key element" in determining the
existence of a duty). Requiring a consideration of the foreseeability of the criminal con-
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inquiry is often an issue for a jury, foreseeability as a matter of law is a
question for the court.24 Because this inquiry is a matter for the judi-
ciary, the court generally retains broad discretion to consider all
surrounding circumstances relevant to the determination of fore-
seeability.2 5
The primacy of foreseeability is perhaps more pronounced in
premises security causes of action than in the context of general
premises liability.2 6 In premises security, the scope of a landowner's
general duty of care includes a duty to take reasonable steps to secure
common areas against foreseeable criminal acts of third parties that are
likely to occur in the absence of such precautionary measures.27 Nev-
ertheless, even after California recognized a premises security cause of
action, a divided court of appeal struggled to determine the proper
foreseeability analysis. 28 Most courts adopted the majority approach,
holding that the requisite foreseeability to impose a duty on a land-
owner could not be established absent a prior similar incident on the
duct is at first a very obvious practical concern; a defendant can never adequately take
measures to prevent harm that, by its very nature, is unforeseeable. A tangential concern,
and perhaps less obvious, is the underlying realization that imposing a duty to prevent
unforeseeable harm will have no effect on the conduct of the individual defendant. See
WILLIAM M. LANDES & RiCHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 4-5
(1987). This realization is dependent upon the further assumption that people, in part,
make decisions based on the effect those decisions will have upon their private resources.
24. Cf W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 45 (5th ed.
1983) (noting that the determination of foreseeability as a matter of law in the context of
causation is properly reserved for the court).
25. See id.
26. See KAMINSKY, supra note 9, at 8-9 (noting that the essential factor that determines
whether a duty to provide protection exists in a specific case is the concept of foreseeabil-
ity). Since the landowner's liability is dependant upon the intentionally injurious act of a
third party, foreseeability of harm is perhaps more attenuated in a premises security suit
compared to an "ordinary" negligence action, where liability rarely depends upon the act
of a third party and almost never is tied to the intentional conduct of a third party. See
Wiener v. Southcoast Childcare Ctrs., Inc., 88 P.3d 517, 524 (Cal. 2004) (distinguishing
between liability for "ordinary" negligence and liability for the criminal acts of third
parties).
27. See Frances T. v. Vill. Green Owners Ass'n, 723 P.2d 573, 578 (Cal. 1986) (Ct. App.
1986) (holding a duty to take affirmative action to control the wrongful acts of a third
party will be imposed only where such conduct can be reasonably anticipated); Kulwicki,
supra note 13, at 249.
28. Compare O'Hara v. W. Seven Trees Corp., 142 Cal. Rptr. 487, 491 (Ct. App. 1977)
(applying the prior similar incidents test to become the first California court to hold a
landlord liable for a third party crime on the premises), with Kwaitkowski v. Superior Trad-
ing Co., 176 Cal. Rptr. 494, 497 (Ct. App. 1981) (holding that the requisite degree of
foreseeability to impose a duty on the landowner to take reasonable measures to prevent
future third party crimes on the premises may be established by a totality of the
circumstances).
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premises. 29 A minority of courts, however, rejected the prior similar
incidents test in favor of the traditional totality of the circumstances
test common to other areas of tort law.
30
In 1985, the California Supreme Court conducted its first com-
prehensive analysis of the role of foreseeability in third party criminal
assaults.31 Addressing the relationship between the degree of foresee-
ability required to establish a duty and the burden associated with that
duty, the court in Isaacs v. Huntington Mem'l Hosp. concluded that fore-
seeability remained a "flexible concept" to be measured in proportion
to the burden of the duty sought to be imposed. 32 The court then
considered the manner by which courts should measure the degree of
foreseeability under a particular set of facts. 33 Rejecting the "rigid"
prior similar incidents test, the Isaacs court adopted the more flexible
"totality of the circumstances" test.34 In support of its decision, the
Isaacs court cited four fundamental flaws with the prior similar inci-
dents test: (1) it discouraged landowners from providing security
against known dangers; (2) it prohibited the first crime victim from
recovering while permitting recovery by subsequent victims; (3) it was
"unworkable" and required courts to enunciate arbitrary distinctions
between prior and subsequent crimes; and (4) it placed too great a
burden on the tortiously injured plaintiff through the "rigid applica-
tion of a mechanical [rule].'35 The lack of a "prior similar incident,"
according to the court, does not prohibit the imposition of a duty
where the nature of the premises, the nature of the surrounding
premises, and general past experience were such that a reasonable
landowner should have foreseen the particular criminal act.3 6 Al-
29. See, e.g., O'Hara, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 491; Anaya v. Turk, 199 Cal. Rptr. 187, 191 (Ct.
App. 1984); Riley v. Marcus, 177 Cal. Rptr. 827, 830 (Ct. App. 1981); Wingard v. Safeway
Stores, Inc., 176 Cal. Rptr. 320, 324 (Ct. App. 1981);Jamison v. Mark C. Bloome Co., 169
Cal. Rptr. 399, 403 (Ct. App. 1980).
30. See, e.g., Kwaitkowski, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 497; Cohen v. Southland Corp., 203 Cal.
Rptr. 572, 577 (Ct. App. 1984); Gomez v. Ticor, 193 Cal. Rptr. 600, 603-04 (Ct. App.
1983).
31. See Isaacs v. Huntington Mem'l Hosp., 695 P.2d 653 (Cal. 1985).
32. Id. at 658. This rule of proportionality by which the foreseeability of harm must be
weighed against the burden, vagueness, and efficacy of the duty sought to be imposed has
been adopted in all subsequent premises security cases. See, e.g., Ann M. v. Pac. Plaza Shop-
ping Ctr., 863 P.2d 207, 215 (Cal. 1993); Sharon P. v. Arman Ltd., 989 P.2d 121, 130 (Cal.
1999).
33. Isaacs, 695 P.2d at 658-62.
34. See id. at 659.
35. Id. At the time of the Isaacs decision, the California Supreme Court was recog-
nized as one of the most activist, "pro-plaintiff" courts in the country. See generally
Sugarman, supra note 1, at 456-57.
36. Id. at 657.
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though not necessary to the finding of a duty, a prior similar incident
is helpful to determine foreseeability. 37 Thus, the requisite foresee-
ability could be established despite the absence of prior similar inci-
dents on the premises.38
In 1994, against the backdrop of widespread criticism of its Isaacs
decision, 39 the California Supreme Court revisited the proper foresee-
ability test in Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center.40 The Ann M.
court commenced by recognizing that the rampant, unpredictable na-
ture of violent crime in modern society significantly raised the burden
associated with landowners preventing crime on their premises. 41 Re-
lying on the rule of proportionality announced in Isaacs, the Ann M.
court reasoned that the foreseeability of the criminal act must be bal-
anced against "the 'burdensomeness, vagueness, and efficacy' of the
proposed security measures. '42 Where the proposed security measure
included hiring security guards-rarely a "'minimal burden' "--the
imposition of such a heavy burden could only be supported by an
equally high degree of foreseeability. 43 This degree of foreseeability
was practically guaranteed by the prior similar incidents test.44 Thus,
the Ann M. court concluded: " [T] he requisite degree of foreseeability
rarely, if ever, can be proven in the absence of prior similar incidents
of violent crime on the landowner's premises."45 In a footnote qualify-
ing its holding, the court stated that "it is possible that some other
circumstances such as immediate proximity to a substantially similar
business establishment that has experienced violent crime on its
37. See Isaacs, 695 P.2d at 659; RESTATEMENT SECOND OF TORTS § 344(f) (1965).
38. See Isaacs, 695 P.2d at 659.
39. See, e.g., Kaufman, supra note 1, at 97 (noting that at the time of the article Califor-
nia was the only jurisdiction to adopt the "totality of the circumstances" rule).
40. 863 P.2d 207, 215 (Cal. 1993).
41. Id.
42. Id. (quoting Gomez v. Ticor, 193 Cal. Rptr. 600, 606 (Ct. App. 1983)).
43. Id. at 215-16. (reasoning that to impose a duty on landowners based on a lesser
showing of foreseeability would ostensibly make landowners the insurers of public safety).
44. Id. at 215.
45. Id. Although the language of the holding was limited to the substantial burden
associated with the duty to provide security guards, it is unclear whether the prior similar
incidents test applies to other preventative measures. In Sharon P. v. Arman, Ltd., 989 P.2d
121, 130-33 (Cal. 1999), the court considered whether the scope of a commercial land-
lord's duty included maintaining previously installed surveillance cameras in operational
condition. The court reasoned that the burden of reasonably maintaining surveillance
cameras at a minimum required the hiring of personnel to monitor them-a burden no
less than hiring security guards. Id. at 130. The Sharon P. court concluded that "[a]bsent
any prior similar incidents or other indications of a reasonably foreseeable risk of violent
criminal assaults in that location, we cannot conclude defendants were required to secure
the area against such crime." Id. at 133.
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premises could provide the requisite degree of foreseeability." 46 In a
similar footnote, the court implied that the foreseeability required to
establish a duty to provide security guards might be satisfied where the
premises is "inherently dangerous. '47 However, the California Su-
preme Court later rejected the "inherently dangerous" premises
argument.48
In an attempt to justify its decision to revisit Isaacs, the Ann M.
court reasoned that the rule announced in Isaacs was unnecessary and
therefore tended to confuse lower courts.49 Specifically, the court con-
tended that the record in Isaacs "contained evidence of prior, violent,
third party attacks on persons on the hospital's premises in close prox-
imity to where the attack at issue in that case occurred. ' 50 However,
more problematic than the Ann M. court's apparent overruling of
Isaacs was the Ann M. court's failure to account for the Isaacs court's
reasoning when it had rejected the prior similar incidents test.5 a Spe-
cifically, although the Isaacs court recognized that judicial discretion
in interpreting the "similarity" of prior and subsequent crimes could
lead to arbitrary results, 52 the Ann M. court did not attempt to further
define these terms in deciding to adopt this "flawed" test.53 Thus, the
foreseeability analysis of Ann M., as it is currently conceived, appears
incapable of producing consistent results. This conclusion is not
merely theoretical but has been borne out by the divided courts of
appeal over the past eleven years.5 4
Having relied on this ground in rejecting the test, and having
ignored it in adopting the test, the court's inaction could hardly be
considered an oversight.55 The Ann M. court's deliberate decision not
to provide further clarification of the test is more accurately viewed as
a calculated attempt to retain judicial discretion in the face of adopt-
46. Ann M., 863 P.2d at 216 n.7.
47. Id. at 216 n.8.
48. Sharon P., 989 P.2d at 127.
49. See Ann M., 863 P.2d at 215-16.
50. Id. (citation omitted).
51. It is one thing to say that the rule announced in Isaacs was unnecessary on the
facts of the case; however, it is another to say, as the court did in Ann. M., that the reason-
ing supporting the unnecessary opinion was incorrect, or at the very least irrelevant.
52. See Isaacs v. Huntington Mem'l Hosp., 695 P.2d 653, 658-59 (Cal. 1985) (noting
that the prior similar incidents test merely replaced one ambiguous term-foreseeability-
with two others-prior and similar).
53. Cf Ann M., 863 P.2d at 214-16.
54. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
55. See Ann M., 863 P.2d at 215 (also noting that one stated purpose of reconsidering
Isaacs was to alleviate confusion generated by its previous opinion).
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ing an otherwise "mechanical" rule.5 6 Any advantages once gained by
retaining judicial discretion, however, have since been outweighed by
the lower courts' confusion. This confusion is the source of the cur-
rent issue before the California Supreme Court: How may courts de-
termine the limitations of the rule announced in Ann. M if the test is
incapable of producing consistent results?
H. The Case: Delgado v. Trax Bar & Grill
The California Supreme Court recently granted review of the
Fifth District's opinion in Delgado v. Trax Bar & Grill.57 In Delgado, the
plaintiff, Michael Delgado, visited Trax Bar & Grill ("Trax"), a bar
owned by the defendant.58 As is typical of such establishments, the
combination of large crowds and alcohol contributed to fights, some-
times in the adjacent parking lot where patrons frequently congre-
gated.59 On weekend nights, Trax assigned two to three security
guards to control the interior of the bar and one security guard to
control the crowd waiting to get into the bar and loitering in the park-
ing lot.60 When Delgado left Trax, Jacob Joseph ('Joseph") followed
Delgado out of the bar and confronted him in the adjacent parking
lot.6' Joseph and Delgado exchanged words, and when a fight be-
tween the two seemed imminent, Joseph called out to a group of
friends in the parking lot.62 The group, twelve to fifteen in number,
surrounded Delgado and began punching and kicking him. 63 Al-
though Delgado was initially able to flee the parking lot, the group
caught up to him and held him down while Joseph hit him in the
head several times with a baseball bat.64 As a result of the assault, Del-
56. But see Isaacs, 695 P.2d at 658-59. This characterization of the Ann M. court's
intention is consistent with its decision to leave open the possibility that "some other cir-
cumstances" might provide the high degree of foreseeability required to establish a duty to
provide security or assume other similarly burdensome measures. See Ann M., 863 P.2d at
215-16 n.7.
57. 134 Cal. Rptr. 2d 548 (Ct. App. 2003).
58. Id. at 549. The record at trial, although not included in the Fifth District's opin-
ion, reflected that a security guard was assigned to patrol the area outside the entrance and
the adjacent parking lot, where large groups of patrons would line up before entering the
bar. See Appellant's Brief at 3, Delgado v. Trax Bar & Grill, 134 Cal. Rptr. 2d 548 (Ct. App.
2003) (No. F040180).
59. Appellant's Brief at 4, Delgado (No. F040180).
60. Id. at 3.
61. Delgado, 134 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 549.
62. Id.
63. See id.
64. Id.
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gado lost consciousness and was hospitalized for sixteen days.65 Del-
gado sued Trax on the theory of premises liability.66
At trial, a jury returned a verdict finding that Trax had a duty to
prevent the assault on Delgado, Trax breached its duty, and that its
breach solely caused Delgado's injuries.67 On de novo review, the Cali-
fornia Court of Appeal for the Fifth District reversed the trial court
judgment, finding that Trax did not owe Delgado a duty to prevent
the unforeseeable violent third party criminal assault.68 Applying the
foreseeability test of Ann M., the Fifth District concluded Delgado
failed to prove sufficient evidence of prior similar incidents on the
premises. 69 Specifically, although the record contained evidence of
prior incidents of "ordinary 'bar fights,"' Delgado presented no evi-
dence that Trax experienced a prior instance of "a coordinated gang
assault on an individual patron."70 In distinguishing the prior "ordi-
nary 'bar fights' "-some of which involved up to nine participants7 1-
from the instant "coordinated gang assault," the court reasoned that
Delgado's assailants were all of the same ethnicity, they were lying in
wait in a manner typical of a gang, and the attack reflected some prior
agreement. 72 Thus, since there was no prior "gang attack" on Trax's
premises, Trax had no duty to prevent the assault.73
After concluding that Trax did not have a duty to provide security
guards in the absence of prior similar incidents, the Fifth District next
considered whether Trax's provision of some security guards removed
the situation from the foreseeability analysis of Ann M.74 In support of
his argument that the voluntary provision of security guards
amounted to an assumption of a duty, Delgado relied on a recent de-
cision from the California Court of Appeals for the First District, Mata
v. Mata.75 In Mata, the defendant bar owner had previously provided
security guards at the bar's main entrance on weekends. 76 On the
65. Id.
66. Id. at 550.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 552-53.
69. Id. at 552.
70. Id. Although the Fifth District did not address the issue, the court seems to imply
that Trax owed its patrons a duty to prevent "ordinary 'bar fights."' See id. (citation
omitted).
71. Appellant's Brief at 6, Delgado (No. F040180).
72. Delgado, 134 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 552.
73. Id. at 552-53.
74. Id. at 551-52.
75. 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 141 (Ct. App. 2003) (review denied).
76. Id. at 143.
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night in question, the defendant recognized a patron as an individual
he had previously banned from the bar for fighting with other pa-
trons. 77 The defendant approached the patron and instructed him to
leave.78 The patron returned later that evening, entered the bar
through an unguarded door, and shot three patrons, killing one.7 9
The Mata court recognized that although a court must ordinarily bal-
ance the foreseeability of harm against the burden sought to be im-
posed, this analysis is "inapposite" where the defendant has already
assumed the burden sought to be imposed.80 The court concluded
that the foreseeability of harm, and thus the prior similar incidents
test, was "irrelevant" when a landowner assumes a duty to provide se-
curity guards.8 1
The Delgado court rejected Mata on three grounds.82 First, the
court concluded that the assumption of a duty rule was contrary to
established precedent.83 In Sharon P. v. Arman, Ltd.,84 the California
Supreme Court refused to create a new foreseeability analysis where a
landowner provided, yet failed to maintain, various security mea-
sures. 85 Instead, the Sharon P. court held that the prior similar inci-
dents test applied even where the security measures, if properly
maintained, "might have diminished the risk of criminal attacks [on
the premises] ."86 Second, the Delgado court reasoned that the "level of
security a landowner must provide must remain tied to-and condi-
tioned upon-the foreseeability of a particular type of criminal activ-
ity on the premises. 87 Fundamentally, the prior similar incidents test
prohibits "the imposition of a limitless duty upon a business owner to
prevent all criminal conduct simply because the business owner has
undertaken to provide some security at the premises."88 Third, the
Fifth District separated the question of the landowner's duty from the
issue of breach.8 9 Specifically, the court stated that the foreseeability
of the particular type of crime must be considered prior to, and inde-
77. Id. at 143-44.
78. Id. at 144.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 145.
81. Id.
82. Delgado, 134 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 551-52.
83. Id.
84. 989 P.2d 121 (Cal. 1999).
85. Id. at 130-33.
86. Id. at 132-33.
87. Delgado, 134 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 551.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 552.
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pendent of, a consideration of whether the landlord negligently hired
or trained the security guards.90 The court concluded that Trax did
not owe Delgado a duty to hire security guards to prevent the assault
because there was insufficient evidence of prior similar incidents.91
Further, Trax had not assumed a duty to provide adequate security by
deciding to provide some security guards. 92
III. Law and Economics
A. Generally
For the rational study of the law the black-letter man may be the
man of the present, but the man of the future is the man of statis-
tics and the master of economics. 9
3
Economics is a science of rational choice in a world of limited
resources.94 One goal of economics is to ascertain the most desirable
distribution of these limited resources. 95 Although there are various
theories of how to best model this distribution, most economists agree
that the optimal distribution is one whereby the minimum aggregate
costs produce the maximum aggregate benefits. 9 6 Central to any eco-
nomic explanation of human affairs is the assumption that man is a
rational utility maximizer in all areas of his life.97 This concept of max-
imizing self-interest implies that people respond to incentives.98 Thus,
economics provides a scientific theory to predict the effects of laws on
social behavior.99
Early legal scholars recognized that laws may provide incentives
in a manner that deters conduct that is not justified on utilitarian
grounds.100 Later scholars argued that courts could use the deterent
90. Id.
91. Id. at 552-53.
92. Id. at 551-53.
93. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 469 (1897).
94. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 3 (5th ed. 1998).
95. See A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 7-11 (3d ed.
2003). An additional consideration outside the scope of this Comment is equity-that is,
the distributive effects of this initial assignment of legal rights.
96. Id. at 7.
97. See POSNER, supra note 94, at 3-4. The term "man" is used in its gender-neutral
identifier of the singular human.
98. Id. at 4. ("[I]f a person's surroundings change in such a way that he could in-
crease his satisfactions by altering his behavior, he will do so.").
99. Id. at 3.
100. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAw (M. Howe ed., 1963); see also
William Shofield, Davies v. Mann: Theory of Contributory Negligence, 3 HARV. L. REv. 263, 269
(1890) (noting that the role of courts is to fashion a "rule of conduct which shall... tend
to prevent like accidents from happening in the future"). But see Fleming James, Jr. &John
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effect of laws to establish standards of conduct designed to promote
efficient resource allocation.10' In 1961, Ronald Coase suggested that,
assuming no "transaction costs," the market will "correct" any initial
inefficient assignment of legal rights.10 2 According to this theorem,
commonly referred to as the "Coase Theorem," if a legal right was
assigned to a party that did not assign the most value to it, then that
party will bargain with other parties that assigned a higher value to
that legal right.10 3 Eventually, the legal right will be assigned to the
party that values it most.'0 4 In this instance, the system of possible
transactions is said to be Pareto optimal; there is no further transac-
tion that will benefit any party without also making another party
worse off. 10 5
The initial allocation of a legal right, however, is not altogether
irrelevant. First, the Coase Theorem recognizes that, although it may
be possible for parties to bargain when the rights at issue are not per-
fectly defined, an efficient exchange is far more likely to occur when
the ownership of various rights is clearly defined at the outset of bar-
gaining.10 6 A second, more compelling argument for the initial effi-
cient assignment of legal rights is the realization that all market
transactions involve transaction costs.' 0 7 Further, as Coase himself
pointed out, some transactions involve costs that are so high that they
J. Dickenson, Accident Proneness and Accident Law, 63 HARV. L. REv. 769, 777-82 (1950)
(suggesting that it was naive to expect law to have a deterrent effect on the overall accident
level). For a more recent discussion of tort law's deterrent effects, see generally Gary T.
Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L.
REv. 377 (1994).
101. See, e.g., Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960); Guido
Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L. J. 499 (1961).
102. See Coase, supra note 101, at 8 ("But the ultimate result (which maximizes the
value of production) is independent of the legal position if the pricing system is assumed
to work without cost."). "In general, [the costs of transactions] include the cost of identify-
ing the parties with whom one has to bargain, the costs of getting together with them, the
costs of the bargaining process itself, and costs of enforcing any bargain reached." POLIN-
SKY, supra note 95, at 14.
103. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 23, at 6-7, 16-17; POSNER, supra note 94, at
13-14.
104. See Coase, supra note 101, at 2-15.
105. See RICHARD CORNES & TODD SANDLER, THE THEORY OF EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC
GOODS, AND CLUB GOODS 22 (2d ed. 1996).
106. See Coase, supra note 101, at 8 ("It is necessary to know whether the damaging
business is liable or not for damage caused since without the establishment of this initial
deliniation of rights there can be no martket transactions to transfer and recombine
them."); POLINSKY, supra note 95, at 14-16 (assignment of clear liability rules reduces the
related transaction costs and increases overall efficiency).
107. See Coase, supra note 101, at 15.
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might prohibit parties from engaging in the necessary exchange. 10 8
Under circumstances where an exchange's transaction costs exceed
the potential gain from the exchange itself, the rational actor will not
bargain and the market will not overcome an initial inefficient
assignment.
When high transaction costs limit the ability of parties to privately
establish duties of care, it is critical, from an economic perspective, for
the court to make the correct assignment in the first place. This is a
classic example of a "liability rule." 10 9 Based upon the initial assign-
ment of a legal right via a liability rule, a party that violates the rights
of another must pay the price of that violation in the form of dam-
ages.110 In effect, an involuntary exchange takes place.' In the con-
text of voluntary exchanges, there is at least an assurance that the
Pareto superior outcome will eventually be achieved. 112 There is no
such assurance in involuntary exchanges, where the compensation of
the injured party may not put that party in a position, utility-wise,
equivalent to his pre-accident state.1 13 The question then is, How
should courts initially assign liability rules in order to achieve the
greatest possible efficiency?' 1 4
B. Economic Analysis of Tort Law
Law and economics is particularly well-suited in the realm of tort
law. 115 The positive economic theory of tort law recognizes that "the
common law of torts is best explained as if the judges who created the
108. Id. ("These operations are often extremely costly, sufficiently costly at any rate to
prevent many transactions that would be carried out in a world in which the pricing system
worked without cost.").
109. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Ina-
lienability: One View of the Cathedra4 85 IARv. L. REv. 1089, 1092 (1972).
110. Id.
111. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 23, 30-31.
112. See POLINSKY, supra note 95, at 43. A transaction that makes one party better off
and no person worse off is said to be a Pareto superior. POSNER, supra note 94, at 13-14; see
also LANDES & POSNER, supra note 23, at 16-17 (criticizing the definition of Pareto effi-
ciency and electing for the more workable Kaldor-Hicks wealth-maximization perspective
of efficiency).
113. See id. Although one can argue that the injurer is better off because she has con-
sented to the exchange by choosing the riskier course of action, this is stretching the limits
of the type of consent that would be consistent with Pareto superiority. Tort compensation
is determined by objective indicators without regard to the subjective valuation of a legal
right underlying involuntary exchanges. See Calabresi & Melemed, supra note 109, at 1092.
Thus, from a Pareto standpoint, there is a danger that the injured party will be undercom-
pensated. Id. at 1108.
114. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 109, 1093-98.
115. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 23, at 1.
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law through decisions operating as precedents in later cases were try-
ing to promote efficient resource allocation." 116 During the past half-
century, American jurisprudence has accepted the economic theory
of tort law as doctrinally appropriate. 1 7 As a general rule, the eco-
nomic approach to tort law seeks to minimize inefficient accidents.'
18
Another way of viewing this goal is to reduce the sum total of the costs
of accidents ("CA") and the costs of accident prevention ("CAP").119
An economic analysis does not seek to reduce the number of all acci-
dents or even the cost of each accident.12° Instead, the economic ap-
proach recognizes that at some point the cost of avoiding accidents
would be greater than the cost of allowing the accident. 121 This goal is
consistent with the notion of allocative efficiency-as long as the ben-
efits of accident avoidance exceed the cost of prevention, it makes
sense to invest in prevention; if, however, avoidance efforts become
more costly than the cost of the accident itself, the continued use of
resources to avoid these accidents would be allocatively inefficienti 22
116. Id.
117. See POSNER, supra note 94, at 167-68.
118. See GuIDO CALABRESi, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970). Calabresi identified three
major types of costs that result from accidents. Primary costs are those associated with the
harm to the injured party, such as the cost of medical care and lost earnings capacity. Id. at
26-27. Secondary costs, according to Calabresi, are "the societal costs resulting from acci-
dents." Id. at 27-28. Tertiary costs are those associated with administering the tort system.
Id. at 28. It is important to note that minimizing one cost may not always be consistent with
minimizing another cost. Id. For example, a system that always accurately assigns the costs
of accidents to those who cause accidents may be expensive to administer. Similarly, some
efforts to reduce secondary accident costs may mean the party causing the accident does
not feel the full impact of the harm done and may not take costjustified steps to avoid the
same accident in the future. Id. at 28-31.
119. See POSNER, supra note 94, at 5-7. If the imposition of a liability rule is intended to
provide an incentive, a fair, albeit not entirely accurate, assumption is that the cost of
accident prevention (CAP) approaches zero in the absence of a duty. Assuming this to be
the case, a court should impose a prospective duty in situations where the cost of accidents
after taking preventative measures plus the cost of those preventative measures is less than
the cost of accidents without having taken such measures. It is not argued that there
should be no duty where CA + CAP = CA, but merely that it should be recognized that the
resolution of this equation necessitates a more complete consideration of secondary cost of
accidents, accident deterrence, and liability outside of the closed system of the accident. See
id, "Accidents," as used in this Comment, refers to any occurrence of injury on business
premises, whether truly "accidental," the result of negligence, or an intentional tort com-
mitted by a third party.
120. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMics 300-02 (3d ed. 2000).
121. See id.
122. See id. The seemingly harsh conventional economic truth is that there may be an
efficient level of accidents that results not just in property damage but also in personal
injury and death.
[Vol. 39
Thus, tort law is concerned with preventing future accidents that are
not cost-justified. 123
The role of law and economics is to create liability rules that in-
duce "injurers" to internalize the costs of accidents. 124 The rule serves
as a warning that people who behave in a certain way that results in an
accident must compensate the victim. 125 Thus, by altering the costs
associated with conduct, the warning may deter inefficient behavior
and reduce the overall cost of accidents. 26 In order to determine
whether the cost of accident avoidance is greater or less than the cost
of the accident, it is first necessary to identify the least costly measure
that would effectively prevent the accident.1 27 By structuring liability
rules to provide incentives for rational maximizers to elect the most
efficient accident avoidance measure, the person deciding whether to
take the preventive measure can then make an informed decision,
thus increasing the overall efficiency of the accident system. In order
to produce this efficiency, law and economics not only seeks to allo-
cate a legal right to the party that values it most, but also to assign the
corresponding legal obligation to the party that is in the better posi-
tion to ensure the desired outcome.' 28 That is to say, the person mak-
ing decisions regarding efficiency should be in the best position to
both access the relevant information and implement the intelligent
decision once made. 29
IV. An Economic Analysis of the Prior Similar Incidents Test
Law and economics is a powerful tool for analyzing a vast range of
legal problems. 30 The descriptive power of law and economics in-
heres in its ability to coherently explain legal rules that at first appear
inconsistent in application.' 31 According to this theory, the apparent
inconsistency in many legal rules results from thejudiciary's failure to
recognize, or at least articulate, the underlying economic forces that
123. Id. Implicit to law and economics is the recognition that some accidents are "una-
voidable" in that the burden of preventing them is so high that the individual actor will
always choose to pay the cost of such conduct over paying the cost of accident prevention.
See id.
124. Id. at 290.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See id. Law and economics not only requires the avoidance of inefficient accidents
but also requires that this be achieved in the most efficient manner possible. Id
128. See id. at 300-04.
129. Id.
130. See POSNER, supra note 94, at 3.
131. See id.
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drive their decisions.13 2 This inconsistency in a sense becomes a self-
fulfilling prophecy as judges who incorrectly explain their decisions in
the "characteristic rhetoric of opinions" actually conceal the underly-
ing rationale.13 3 Judges deciding subsequent cases further this con-
cealment through misplaced reliance on incorrectly decided
precedent. 134 The California Supreme Court's decision in Ann M. on
premises security provides an example of how an incorrectly articu-
lated, yet properly conceived, legal rule causes confusion. The applica-
tion of law and economics is capable of resolving the confusion
amongst the California courts by articulating a clear and coherent lia-
bility rule in terms of economic efficiency.
The California Supreme Court has adopted a framework that fur-
thers efficient resource allocation.13 5 In the context of premises secur-
ity, the court stated that the framework for determining the existence
of a landowner's duty to take affirmative measures to prevent third
party violent crime required a balancing of the foreseeability of the
injury against the burden associated with the duty sought to be im-
posed.' 36 Assuming that the court's determination that an affirmative
duty to provide security guards may not be imposed absent prior simi-
lar incidents on the premises, and further assuming that this determi-
nation is proper, 137 it is possible to analyze the proper interpretation
of the prior similar incidents in terms of efficient resource allocation.
A. Efficient Resource Allocation in Premises Security
Applying the Coase Theorem to premises liability, crime avoid-
ance would take place at the greatest possible efficiency regardless of
the initial assignment of a legal right. 38 However, the transaction
costs incident to premises liability prohibit the market from overcom-
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. See, e.g., Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 564 (Cal. 1968).
136. See Sharon P. v. Arman, Ltd., 989 P.2d 121, 126 n.2 (Cal. 1999); Ann M. v. Pac.
Plaza Shopping Ctr., 863 P.2d 207, 212 (Cal. 1993); Isaacs v. Huntington Mem'l Hosp., 695
P.2d 653, 658 (Cal. 1985).
137. Cf Ann M., 863 P.2d at 215. Although the Ann M. court qualified its holding by
stating that it is possible that some other circumstances may provide the requisite "high
degree of foreseeability," the court has never addressed the viability of this qualification. Id.
This Comment assumes that the "other circumstances" exception to the prior similar inci-
dents test is no longer viable.
138. Cf POLINSKY, supra note 95, at 36-39, 43 (noting that if there are no transaction
costs, in the context of a poluting factory, the most efficient outcome will be achieved
regardless of the choice of remedy entitlement).
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ing an initial inefficient assignment.1 39 Therefore, it is imperative that
the California Supreme Court's liability rules initially achieve efficient
resource allocation. As previously stated, law and economics seeks to
prevent only those accidents whose cost is greater than the cost of the
most efficient means of preventing the accident and the cost of the
accident after taking these preventive measures. 140 For purposes of
this Comment, it is assumed that the aggregate cost comes primarily
from two sources: (1) the cost of the injury to the victim, and (2) the
cost of the preventative measures. 141 Using the law and economics ra-
tional maximizer model, the determination of the existence of a duty
should provide incentives for people to act in furtherance of efficient
resource allocation. 142 With the benefit of hindsight, courts would im-
pose a duty on a landowner to take reasonable measures to provide
adequate security guards only in those instances where the cost of pro-
viding such reasonably adequate security is the most efficient means
of preventing the third party crime and the cost of the crime is re-
duced by a value greater than the cost of providing the security
guards. 143 However, given that law and economics is prospective and
concerned with shaping future conduct, efficiency is achieved by im-
posing a duty where the cost of a foreseeable third party violent crime
outweighs the burden associated with the most efficient measure that
could have prevented the foreseeable criminal conduct. 144 This rela-
tionship between foreseeability of harm and the burden of prevent-
ative measures is at the core of efficient resource allocation in
premises security.
Assuming the substantial burden associated with providing secur-
ity guards is constant, two implications emerge: (1) the more broadly
courts define foreseeability, the more likely the court will impose a
duty on a landowner to provide security guards; and (2) the more
narrowly a court defines foreseeability, the less likely a court will im-
139. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 23, at 133 ("The costs of transactions are prohibi-
tive when the potential victims of accidents are numerous and unidentifiable third par-
ties-travelers at railroad crossings, pedestrians, other drivers.").
140. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 120, at 300-02.
141. See CAL.ABREsi, supra note 118, at 26-27. For purposes of this Comment, the value
for CA is limited to what Calabresi defined as "primary" costs associated with the number
and severity of accidents. See id. at 26.
142. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 120, at 290.
143. See id.
144. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Positive Economic Theory of Tort
Law, 15 GA. L. REv. 851, 857-59 (1981).
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pose a duty on a landowner to provide security guards. 145 The ques-
tion then becomes, How does defining foreseeability in terms of prior
similar incidents promote efficient resource allocation?
1. Efficient Resource Allocation Requires a Prior Incident
Efficient resource allocation requires liability rules that assign le-
gal obligations to the party who is in the best position to access and
analyze information relevant to an intelligent decision. 146 Unfortu-
nately, in today's society, third party violent crime is rampant and
largely unpredictable. 147 Because of the ubiquitous and unpredictable
nature of third party crime, it is difficult to imagine any public prem-
ises that could remain completely insulated from third party violent
crime.' 4 To some extent, crime is "foreseeable" anywhere and at any
time. In this respect, no one party is in a better position to access
information because all parties are initially similarly situated with re-
spect to the foreseeability of third party crime on a particular prem-
ises. Absent prior crime on the premises, both the landowner and the
victim are in the same position with respect to relevant information.
Where the parties are similarly situated with respect to information
necessary to making informed decisions, placing a duty on a land-
owner is inefficient. The high transaction costs associated with ad-
ministering such a burden shifting system would outweigh any
potential benefit of shifting financial responsibility from the innocent
victim to the equally blameless landowner. Thus, where the parties are
similarly situated, the duty should follow the harm.
Where the landowner knows of prior violent third party crime on
the premises, however, the landowner is in a better position to access
relevant information as compared to the victim of third party crime.
Typically, landowners, whether owners or operators of commercial
premises, are involved with the day-to-day operation of their business.
This regular involvement requires landowners to be present on the
145. Of course this is not always true. It is not difficult to imagine circumstances that
satisfy a narrow definition of duty but do not satisfy the broader definition. For example, in
jurisdictions that adopt a literal approach to the prior similar incidents test, a prior similar
incident triggers a duty no matter how "unforeseeable" the subsequent third party criminal
act would be under the totality of the circumstances approach.
146. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 120, at 315.
147. See Ann M. v. Pac. Plaza Shopping Ctr., 863 P.2d 207, 215 (Cal. 1993) ("Unfortu-
nately, random, violent crime is endemic in today's society.").
148. See id. ("It is difficult, if not impossible, to envision any locale open to the public
where the occurrence of violent crime seems improbable.").
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premises either personally or through an appointed agent. 149 The
landowner is thus physically present on the premises more frequently
and for longer durations than the ordinary patron. This temporal ad-
vantage allows for greater access to information. Additionally, the
landowner's position of control over the nature of the premises re-
quires the landowner to have a system of efficient information gather-
ing, which empowers landowners to make intelligent decisions, thus
promoting efficient resource allocation.
By requiring a prior criminal incident on the premises as a pre-
requisite to establishing a duty in Ann M.,150 the California Supreme
Court not only ensured that potential liability is assigned to the party
with the best access to information, but it further ensured that this
party has actually received this information. The prior incident rule ex-
plicitly and narrowly defined the element of notice for third party vio-
lent crimes on the premises. Generally, the element of notice is
common to tort law. 151 A plaintiff may typically establish foreseeability
through evidence that the defendant had "actual" or "constructive"
notice of the information tending to make plaintiff's injury foresee-
able. Actual notice is satisfied where the defendant knew of the cir-
cumstances making the accident foreseeable.152 Constructive notice is
established where the defendant should have known of the circum-
stances making the accident foreseeable. 1 53
The prior incident requirement eliminates the possibility of prov-
ing constructive notice based on a totality of the circumstances. In-
stead, the plaintiff must prove either that the landowner had actual
knowledge of the prior criminal conduct or that the prior criminal
conduct was of a type that the landowner should have known of
through exercising ordinary care. 15 4 This treatment of notice recog-
nizes the reality that, once there is a prior crime on the premises, the
149. A difficult question, outside the scope of this Comment, in premises security litiga-
tion is the degree to which a landowner should incur liability based on prior criminal acts
that occurred prior to the defendant's ownership of the property.
150. See supra text accompanying notes 44-46.
151. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 18 (West 1982); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 358
(1965).
152. See I.E. Assoc. v. Safeco Title Insurance Co., 702 P.2d 596, 598 (Cal. 1985).
153. See CAL. CiV. CODE § 19 (West 1982).
154. See Wiener v. Southcoast Childcare Ctrs., Inc., 88 P.3d 517, 520 (Cal. 2004) (not-
ing that defendants' motions for summary judgment stated that they did not have actual
notice of the prior incidents). Although a plaintiff may still prove constructive notice of the
prior criminal act, the plaintiff may not meet her burden unless she first meets the height-
ened requirement of proving a previous criminal act indicative of the landowner's actual
knowledge of that previous conduct.
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landowner is likely to investigate and report violent third party crime
because such conduct is likely detrimental to business.' 55 This finan-
cial interest in the premises, combined with the widespread publicity
surrounding many crimes, 156 makes it extremely likely that landown-
ers will often in fact receive actual notice of prior third party violent
crimes on the premises. 157 Nevertheless, even if the landowner did not
have actual notice of the prior crime, it may still be possible to prove
that the landowner should have known of the prior crime. Removing
the totality of the circumstances test from the foreseeability analysis
increases efficiency by providing an actual third party crime that the
landowner can use in her efficiency calculation. Thus, by assuming
that the cost of future accidents will be proportionate to the cost of
the prior accident, the landowner can then compare the cost of per-
mitting future crimes (CA) with the cost of taking reasonable mea-
sures to prevent that accident (CAp).158
A second advantage of defining notice in terms of prior incidents
is that it serves to reduce the cost of information gathering. Relevant
information regarding previous criminal conduct will flow towards
landowners through the regular course of business. In this respect,
landowners are only accountable for information that is already availa-
ble at a minimal cost. This reduced cost of information gathering di-
rectly reduces the cost of accident prevention. Reduced accident
prevention cost increases the likelihood that landowners will take pre-
ventative measures. A rational actor will choose the least costly course
of conduct. Where the cost of prevention increasingly becomes lower
than the cost of a greater number of accidents, accident prevention
becomes the more efficient alternative on more occasions. Thus, the
greater number of inefficient accidents that are prevented, the
greater the overall efficiency of the accident system.
A further advantage of a bright-line notice rule requiring actual
notice is that landowners have access to information regarding when
they will be subject to liability for failing to take reasonable precau-
155. See KaMINSKv, supra note 9, at 104-06.
156. Of reported crimes, many are associated with police investigations, insurance re-
ports, and even news investigations. Id.
157. Of course, it is possible that a landowner will not actually receive notice of the
criminal conduct if the crime is not reported or the landowner is an absentee landlord.
158. See discussion infra Part IV.A.2. Although a landowner may have a duty to prevent
similar incidents, for purposes of the initial efficiency calculation the values of the cost of
the accident and the cost of accident prevention are obtained from the prior incident.
[Vol. 39
tions. 159 As previously discussed, the clear articulation of legal obliga-
tions increases the efficiency of resource allocation. 160 Under the
rational decision maker model, before the decision maker can decide
whether it is more efficient to permit or take reasonable measures to
prevent an accident, the decision maker must know when she is in a
position of potential liability. A clear liability rule also permits the
landowner to prepare for the cost of assuming or avoiding liability. If
the business owner decides to attempt to avoid liability and provide
adequate security, then the owner may accurately pass the cost of this
measure on to the customers who arguably receive the greatest benefit
of the prevention.1 6 ' If the owner decides not to provide security, the
owner may then choose to insulate herself from liability by either self-
insuring or obtaining insurance from a third party insurer. Where a
landowner decides to obtain third party insurance, insurers may more
accurately determine the premiums associated with the individual
premises. 162
The Ann M. court's requirement that a prior incident occur on
the premises is consistent with the law and economics goal of provid-
ing decision makers with sufficient notice to make informed, intelli-
gent decisions regarding liability. Given its purpose of providing
notice, the prior similar incident requirement is satisfied when the
following three conditions are met: (1) a previous similar crime oc-
curred on the premises while the defendant landowner had control of
the premises; (2) the landowner knew or should have known of the
prior similar crime; and (3) the landowner had sufficient time after
the previous similar crime and before the crime giving rise to the liti-
gation so as to implement efficient preventative measures if taken.
159. At which point a landowner becomes potentially liable is different than for what
they become liable, which is discussed more fully in the consideration of the effect of the
similarity requirement. See infra Part IV.A.2.
160. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 120, at 319-21.
161. Although law and economics is concerned with equity insofar as the distribution
of wealth, risk, and costs, this Comment's primary focus is on the efficiency model. See
POLINSX', supra note 95, at 7. Thus, this Comment assumes that equity is not implicated in
the premises security context. Obviously, where the costs are passed on to customers, this
implicates the equity of such an efficient model. See Saelzler v. Advanced Group, 23 P.3d
1143, 1152 (Cal. 2001) (noting that in the context of a landlord's duty, "the ultimate costs
of imposing liability for failure to provide sufficient ... security to prevent assaults would
be passed on to the tenants of low-cost housing in the form of increased rents, adding to
the financial burden on poor renters").
162. See POLINSK', supra note 95, at 57-62.
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Thus, the prior similar incidents analysis implicates a temporal rela-
tionship between the two crimes. 16 3
As to this temporal element, when determining whether a crime
is sufficiently prior, courts must address both ends of the timeline: (1)
does a prior crime cease to provide sufficient notice over time such
that the landowner and the victim are returned to an equal position of
information access?; and (2) does a prior crime fail to provide suffi-
cient notice if it does not allow the landowner sufficient time to make
and implement an intelligent decision? As to the first question, in
terms of efficiency, it seems that the duty flowing from a single previ-
ous crime should not be endless. At a certain point, the prolonged
nonoccurrence of criminal conduct on the premises would likely
cause the decision maker to decide that continued maintenance of
crime prevention measures is in itself inefficient.1 64
This determination is consistent with the law and economics re-
quirement that decisions as to efficiency be made by the most in-
formed party. So long as maintenance of reasonable security guards
no longer appears efficient based on information gained from the
prior crime, then overall efficiency is obtained. If the prior crime oc-
curred so long ago that the landowner is no longer in a position of
increased access to information, however, then the high transaction
costs of litigation would no longer justify the shift of financial respon-
sibility from the injured party to the landowner. The question then
becomes, How long is too long and who should make this determina-
tion? This determination is further complicated where the landowner
has taken effective accident prevention precautions that could ac-
count for the nonoccurrence of subsequent third party crimes. 165
163. In addition to this temporal relationship, notice also implicates a spatial relation-
ship. As the Ann M. court pointed out, notice could be proven where a prior crime oc-
curred on the premises of an immediately adjacent premises. See Ann M. v. Pac. Plaza
Shopping Ctr., 863 P.2d 207, 215-16 n.7 (Cal. 1993). However, the spatial relationship is
beyond the scope of this Comment, which assumes that the prior crime occurred on the
premises.
164. Obviously, one consideration is whether the provision of the preventative mea-
sures is in fact preventing the occurrence of the criminal conduct on the premises, in
which case the duty would flow from the prior occurrence until it is clear that there is
another reason that crime is not occurring on the premises.
165. This issue is not fatal to the analysis, but is beyond the scope of this Comment. It is
possible that either the legislature, experienced in determining the limits of such a stale-
ness question in a manner similar to a statute of limitations bar, or the judiciary, able to
accurately account for the rapidly changing nature and socio-economic composition of
California, may properly make this determination.
[Vol. 39
PREMISES SECURITY LITIGATION
On the other end of this spectrum, efficient resource allocation
requires that the decision maker be allowed to process the informa-
tion and implement a decision once it is made. 166 For example, re-
quiring a landowner to implement preventative measures without
sufficient time to react to multiple crimes as part of one larger crime
would create a duty that a landowner could never meet. Therefore,
efficient resource allocation would not ensue. However, unlike the un-
certainty surrounding situations where the prior crime may have oc-
curred so long ago that it may no longer provide a landowner with
relevant information, courts and juries are familiar with conducting
fact-based inquiries regarding the adequacy of time needed to imple-
ment reasonable preventative measures. 167
The prior third party violent crime requirement is consistent with
the underlying principles of law and economics. The reliance on a
bright-line rule provides for efficient resource allocation by ensuring
that the rational decision maker is the individual with the best access
to the relevant information and that she is the person who is capable
of effectuating her intelligent decision. The prior incident itself also
reduces the cost associated with the information gathering process,
thus contributing to an overall efficiency. 168 Finally, the requirement
allows decision makers to obtain liability insurance and accurately pass
on the costs to consumers.
2. Efficient Resource Allocation Requires a Similar Incident
Efficient resource allocation requires courts to assign a legal obli-
gation to a party that is in a position to effectively implement its intel-
ligent decision once made. t69 This requires that once the rational
maximizer with the best access to relevant information determines ac-
cident prevention is more efficient than the accident, that person
must be in a position to implement the most efficient, effective acci-
dent prevention means. When a rational decision maker decides to
166. Cf COOTER & ULEN, supra note 120, at 315. Although efficient resource allocation
places the burden of accident prevention on the party with the best access to information,
this allocation would be meaningless if the party charged with making efficient decisions
could not process this information. Id.
167. See KEETON, supra note 24, at § 31.
168. The cost of accident prevention includes the cost of acquiring enough informa-
tion to take precautions sufficient to prevent the occurrence of an accident.
169. Cf POSNER, supra note 94, at 5-7, 199-200. Where a goal of tort law is to reduce
the sum of the cost of accidents and the cost of accident prevention, causing a landowner
to internalize the cost of accidents through liability rules would never produce greater
efficiency where the landowner's accident prevetntion measures could not reduce the cost
of the accident, especially where the adminstrative costs of litigation are high. Id.
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take accident prevention measures, she does so assuming that taking
such measures will actually reduce the cost of future accidents at a
degree greater than the cost of the most efficient preventative mea-
sure.170 Thus, since liability rules assign the cost of an accident to the
possessor of the legal obligation, efficiency is achieved where the
scope of the liability rule includes only those accidents that the deci-
sion maker is able to prevent based on information acquired through
the occurrence of the prior crime. 171 But, does the occurrence of the
prior crime make the occurrence of other crimes equally foreseeable,
and, if so, which other crimes? The similarity requirement provides a
meaningful connection between the prior third party violent crime,
the efficient accident prevention measures, and the criminal conduct
giving rise to the litigation. 172
The overall law and economics goal of efficient resource alloca-
tion includes the localized goal of reducing the sum total of the cost
of the accident and the cost of accident prevention (CA + CAP). Ab-
sent a legal obligation (CA = 0), a rational commercial landlord will
not assume the cost of the accident, and thus will not take accident
prevention measures (CAP = 0). Upon the initial assignment of a legal
obligation to a landowner, the landlord has not taken any accident
prevention measures and the sum of the cost of the accident and the
accident prevention is the cost of the accident itself (CA + CAP = CA).
If CA + CAP is to be decreased, CA must be decreased at a rate greater
than the associated increase in CA. If there is no similarity between
the prior crime and the subsequent crime, the preventative measures
taken in light of the previous crime, if taken, might not prevent the
occurrence of the subsequent crime. Thus, these measures might not
reduce the cost associated with the subsequent, dissimilar accident17 3
If the landowner decided to meet her duty, there would be a slight
reduction in the value of CA for related crimes that were prevented
and an increased value for CAP. The total would likely not be less than
the no fault liability model where the landowner took no precautions
assuming that the change in the cost of accident prevention is equal
170. Id. It is irrational to take accident preventative measures that will not prevent the
occurrence of the accident since it will increase the cost of accident prevention without an
equivalent decrease in the cost of the accident.
171. POSNER, supra note 94, at 199-204.
172. See, e.g., Ann M. v. Pac. Plaza Shopping Ctr., 863 P.2d 207, 215 (Cal. 1993).
173. This argument assumes that the only measures that a landowner would take are
those that are related to the prior conduct. This is because a rational landowner would not
attempt to protect against the virtually unlimited liability of preventing all subsequent un-
related crimes.
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to the change in the cost of the accident (A CAP = A CA). If true, a
rational actor would likely not take any preventative measures and in-
stead direct her energy into insulating herself from the effects of the
inevitable liability.
In order for the liability rules associated with the requirement of
a prior criminal act to reflect the likely conduct of a rational actor, the
scope of the landowner's liability should only be limited to the type of
conduct that she could reasonably have prevented based on the fore-
seeability established by the prior crime. This consideration of preven-
tion implicates a causal connection between the prior accident, the
preventative measures, and the subsequent criminal conduct. Similar-
ity is not a direct qualitiative comparison between the nature of the
prior criminal conduct and the instant criminal conduct. Rather, in
order to promote efficiency, two crimes are "similar" if the most effi-
cient measures to prevent the prior crime could have prevented the
subsequent crime from occurring.
Thus, under the law and economics interpretation of the similar-
ity requirement, two crimes are sufficiently similar to impose a duty on
a landowner if the same efficient preventative measures that could
have prevented the prior crime could also have prevented the subse-
quent crime. The appropriate questions to ask in the foreseeability
analysis are the following: (1) Was there a prior criminal incident on
the premises?; (2) If a prior criminal incident occurred on the prem-
ises, is taking reasonable measure to hire and train security guards,
the most-efficient, effective accident avoiding measure?; and (3) If
providing reasonable security guards would have been the most effi-
cient measure of effectively preventing the prior crime, is it more effi-
cient to hire and train security guards, or to allow future occurrences
of the prior crime? If after answering the preceding three questions it
is more efficient to take reasonable measures to hire and train security
guards, then the landlord's duty to prevent subsequent crimes ex-
tends only to those crimes that could have been prevented if the land-
lord had reasonably hired and trained security guards.
One implication of the revised similarity requirement is the ten-
dency of the revised prior similar incidents test to be inclusive of lesser
crimes. Common sense dictates that the more serious the prior crime,
the heavier the burden associated with the preventative measures, and
the more likely that other crimes could have been prevented. Thus,
the occurrence of a violent assault would likely impose a duty to hire a
security guard, and the provision of security guards would likely pre-
vent lesser-included offenses and other crimes. Once providing a se-
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curity guard is within the scope of a landowner's duty, however, she
does not then become strictly liable for all criminal conduct on the
premises. The court must determine on a case-by-case basis which
crimes could have been prevented in light of providing a security
guard in response to the prior crime. This would be consistent with
the reality that the security guards cannot prevent all crimes, or even
"lesser" crimes.1 7 4
A second implication of the revised similarity requirement is the
manner in which the causal interpretation addresses the reasoning of
law and economics by protecting the landowner from unpredictable,
and thus uninsurable, liability. Ensuring that the prior and subse-
quent crimes are causally connected-due to the lack of preventative
measures taken after the prior crime-increases the likelihood that
the effects of the two crimes are likewise connected. The inference is
not perfect, but it does provide some degree of predictability. The
occurrence of these lesser offenses would likely be included in the
overall insurance policy such that the landowner is over-insured. This
problem, however, should remedy itself over time as the liability
model becomes more familiar to landowners and insurers alike.
A third implication of this causal interpretation of the similarity
requirement is that it ensures a predictable liability model. The prior
incident requirement allows a rational decision maker to make intelli-
gent decisions with regard to liability by ensuring that the landowner
has notice of when she will be liable for her inefficient conduct. 175
However, the prior incident requirement lacks the quantitative com-
ponent necessary to make a fully informed decision. That is, a land-
owner knows that once there is a violent third party crime on her
premises she must compensate victims of subsequent identical crimes
if providing security guards is the most efficient means of preventing
that crime and she does not take reasonable precautions in the hiring
and training of these security guards. The landowner will then decide
whether it is more efficient to prevent future identical third party
crimes or to reasonably hire and train security guards. The only infor-
mation available for the landowner to make an informed rational de-
cision is the cost of the prior accident.
Noticeably absent is the cost of other, similar foreseeable acci-
dents. The actual cost of subsequent accidents may be significantly
174. See Delgado v. Trax Bar & Grill, 134 Cal. Rptr. 2d 548, 552 (Ct. App. 2003) (refer-
encing the flying of airplanes by terrorists into commercial skyscrapers as such an event
that would not be included under the scope of previous occurrences of violent assaults).
175. See discussion supra Part IV.A. 1.
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different from the cost of the prior accident on which the rational
decision maker previously relied. Where a landowner correctly deter-
mines that it is more efficient to pay the cost of the accident than to
prevent future occurrences of the prior accident, if the scope of the
landowner's duty included other accidents associated with a higher
cost, then it is possible that the cost of avoiding the accident was less
than the cost of the subsequent accident. Thus, the landowner's once
efficient decision is rendered inefficient after the fact and the land-
owner would, in effect, be punished for choosing the efficient course
of action based on the then available information. Requiring that the
prior crime be similar to the subsequent crime provides at least some
assurance that the cost associated with the subsequent crime will be
quantitatively similar to the subsequent crime.
A final implication of this similarity requirement is that landown-
ers may pass on the cost of either incurring liability or insuring them-
selves in a manner proportionate not only to the accident prevention,
but also to the foreseeable liability. This proportionality also ensures
that third party insurers may more accurately predict liability and re-
flect that accuracy in their premiums. 176 All these advantages of limit-
ing the scope of liability to prior crimes are either implicitly or
explicitly reflected in the law and economics efficient resource alloca-
tion model.
The causal interpretation of the similarity requirement furthers
the efficient resource allocation underlying the prior similar incidents
test. If the occurrence of a prior crime imposes a duty to prevent that
exact crime from occurring subsequently, this is because courts have
recognized that the prevention of the cost associated with the crime is
efficiently reduced where the landowner has a high degree of foresee-
ability. 177 Since this specific burden, the cost of accident prevention,
does not change based upon the occurrence or nonoccurrence of sub-
sequent crimes, the more crimes that the imposed burden prevents,
the greater the reduction in the cost of accidents generally, and the
lower the sum total of the cost of accidents and cost of accident pre-
vention. Thus, the causal interpretation would promote more efficient
resource allocation.
Nevertheless, once a court has applied the refined prior similar
incidents test to find that a third party criminal act was sufficiently
176. Cf COOTER & ULEN, supra note 120, at 323 (noting that insurance markets are
competetive when the premiums collected from policy-holders equal the sum of the claims
paid to policy-holders and the costs of administration).
177. See Ann M., 863 P.2d at 215.
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foreseeable, the court must still weigh the remaining Rowland factors
when determining whether to impose a duty on the landowner. 178 In
light of the high degree of foreseeability ensured by the prior similar
incidents test, however, the practical role of these factors in the deter-
mination of a duty in the context of premises security tends to be
confusing. It is well settled in California that foreseeability is the most
important consideration when a court is determining whether to im-
pose a duty on a landowner in a premises security case. 179 Further, it is
fairly well established that the requisite degree of foreseeability to im-
pose an affirmative duty to provide security guards will never be met
in the absence of prior similar incidents of third party violent crime
on the premises.180 Therefore, in practice, a court that finds that the
harm from a third party criminal act was so highly foreseeable as to
establish a duty to provide reasonably adequate security guards may
only find no duty where the other factors, individually or together,
provide an equally compelling reason to not impose a duty so as to
overcome the high degree of foreseeability of the third party crime.
Although the proper role of the remaining Rowland factors is outside
the scope of this Comment, it follows that a law and economics analy-
sis that is consistent with many of these traditional policy considera-
tions will almost always impose a duty to prevent foreseeable third
party criminal conduct on the premises.
178. See Isaacs v. Huntington Mem'l Hosp., 695 P.2d 653, 662-63 (Cal. 1985) (consid-
ering the remaining factors before imposing a duty on the landowner to take reasonable
measures to provide adequate security guards to prevent the foreseeable third party crimi-
nal attack); Shannon Sweeney, "Inherently Dangerous" Premises: Sharon P. v. Arman, Ltd.
Dictates That Criminal Acts of Third Parties Are Foreseeable in California Commercial Parking Struc-
tures, 33 U.S.F. L. REv. 521, 525 (1999) (noting that California courts must still weigh the
remaining Rowland factors in determining the existence of a duty in a premises security
case).
Courts should weigh:
[T]he foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the
plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's
conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's
conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the
defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise
care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of
insurance for the risk involved.
Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 564 (Cal. 1968).
179. See Ann M., 863 P.2d at 215.
180. See id. It is fairly well established that prior similar incidents are required to im-
pose a duty to hire security guards because, although the court has never expressly rejected
the viability of the "other circumstances" exception to the test, it has never relied on it
either. See, e.g., Sharon P. v. Arman, Ltd., 989 P.2d 121, 133 (Cal. 1999) (rejecting the
"inherendy dangerous" premises doctrine to prove foreseeability absent prior similar
incidents).
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Finally, once a court has applied the refined prior similar inci-
dents test to conclude that it is proper to impose a duty on a land-
owner, it is then necessary to precisely define the duty. While
imposing a strict liability regime is consistent with, and oftentimes
preferable under, a law and economics analysis, the California Su-
preme Court has adopted a negligence regime in the context of prem-
ises security litigation.18' Here, where the defendant landowner has
taken reasonable care in the hiring, training, and maintenance of se-
curity guards, no breach will be found even if a plaintiff nevertheless
suffers injury. Although the negligence regime permits victims of
highly foreseeable third party crimes to go uncompensated where it
would ordinarily be efficient to make the landowner compensate
them, this limit on liability is justified by two related concerns underly-
ing premises security generally. First, the unique nature of third party
crime makes it likely tha1 many crimes will occur no matter the rea-
sonableness, or even vigilance, of the landowner's preventative mea-
sures. 182 Second, is the California courts' refusal to make landowners
the insurers of public safety. 183 To hold landowners liable for the "fail-
ure to deter wanton, mindless acts of violence of a third person" re-
gardless of the degree of care exhibited in the discharge of their duty
would effectively make the landowner "the insurer of absolute safety
of everyone who enters the premises." 184 Therefore, although holding
a landowner strictly liable for the cost resulting from a third party
criminal act upon a person on the premises might reduce the overall
cost of the accident system, other recognized policy limits require that
the landcwner's duty be limited to taking reasonable steps to hire,
train, and maintain security guards where there is a prior similar inci-
dent on the premises.
3. Efficient Resource Allocation is Consistent with Prior Case Law
Law and economics is doctrinally appropriate not only in its abil-
ity to provide a removed, coherent analysis to premises security litiga-
tion, but also because it is consistent with the previous decisions of the
181. See, e.g., Isaacs, 695 P.2d at 663 ("Once a court finds that the defendant was under
a duty to protect the plaintiff, it is for the factfinder to decide whether the security mea-
sures were reasonable under the circumstances. The jury must decide whether the security
was adequate." (citations omitted)).
182. Noble v. L.A. Dodgers, Inc., 214 Cal. Rptr. 395, 399 (Ct. App. 1985) ("No one can
reasonably contend that even a significant increase in police personnel will prevent all
crime or any particular crime.").
183. See, e.g., Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400, 23 P.3d 1143, 1154 (Cal. 2001).
184. Nola M. v. Univ. of S. Cal., 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 97, 108 (Ct. App. 1993).
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California Supreme Court. Judicial reasoning is often consistent with
economic rationale but expressed in non-economic language. Apply-
ing the law and economics analysis to the courts' reasoning over the
past twenty years illustrates this phenomenon.
a. Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hospital
Although it may at first seem counterintuitive to include a case
rejecting the prior similar incident test as support for the California
Supreme Court's decision to later adopt the test, the court itself rec-
ognized that the reasoning behind the prior similar incidents test was
present in this decision. 185 In Isaacs, the plaintiff, Dr. Isaacs, was shot
once at close range while arranging some materials in the trunk of his
car, which was parked in the defendant hospital's parking lot.18 6 The
plaintiff sued the hospital for the failure to "provide adequate security
measures to protect [persons] against the criminal acts of third per-
sons on its premises."1 87 At trial, the plaintiff offered evidence that the
hospital was located in a "high crime area" and that, although there
had never been a shooting on the premises, it had been the location
of numerous assaults and other criminal conduct over the years.' 88
Applying the totality of the circumstances test to the facts before it,
the court reversed the trial court's decision to grant the defendant's
motion for a nonsuit.189 In holding that the hospital owed the doctor
a duty to provide adequate security measures, the court found that the
occurrence of prior similar incidents, although not necessary to the
finding of an affirmative duty, is helpful to determine foreseeabil-
ity. 190 Thus, the Isaacs court considered evidence of prior, violent
third party attacks on the premises, along with other evidence of fore-
seeability, to impose a duty on the defendant. 191
185. Ann M. v. Pac. Plaza Shopping Ctr., 863 P.2d 207, 215 (1993). The Ann M. court
reasoned:
[The court was] not reluctant to revisit the rule announced in Isaacs because it
was unnecessary for this court to consider the viability of the 'prior similar inci-
dents' rule in order to decide the Isaacs case: the record contained evidence of
prior, violent, third party attacks on persons on the hospital's premises in close
proximity to where the attack at issue in that case occurred.
Id.
186. See Isaacs, 695 P.2d at 655.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 655-56.
189. Id. at 662.
190. Id. at 659.
191. See id. at 661-62.
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The Isaacs court's reasoning is consistent with the law and eco-
nomics methodology. Indeed, the reasoning that the court employed
in rejecting the necessity of prior similar incidents was the very same
reasoning upon which it later relied in adopting the prior similar inci-
dents test.'9 2 Under the facts of this case, the court found neither the
absence of a prior shooting on the premises nor the absence of violent
crime at the exact location to be dispositive in its analysis. 193 Rather,
the court reasoned that the occurrence of prior violent crime and re-
ported threats of violence anywhere on the premises was sufficient for
the court to impute knowledge of prior third party crimes on the
premises. 194 Under the facts of the case, the court implicitly found
that the prior assaults were sufficiently similar to the shooting of Dr.
Isaacs.195
Additional support for the proposed causal interpretation of
"similar" incidents is found in a controversial footnote in the Isaacs
decision. 96 There, the court suggested that an affirmative finding of a
duty would presumptively establish proximate causation since a thor-
ough consideration of foreseeability as part of the duty analysis would
necessarily satisfy the foreseeability requirement of the causation anal-
ysis. 197 Although the court subsequently rejected this mischaracteriza-
tion of the proximate cause analysis,' 98 this statement nevertheless
sheds light on the court's reasoning at the time of the Isaacs opinion.
Much like the rationale of the "causal interpretation" of the test's
"similarity" requirement proposed herein, the Isaacs court appeared
to look to the purpose of the similar incidents requirement, determin-
ing that the requirement is satisfied where the efficient preventative
measures based on a landowner's notice of the previous crime could
have prevented the subsequent crime.
b. Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center
In light of considerable dissension amongst the lower courts fol-
lowing the Isaacs decision, 199 the California Supreme Court "refined"
the foreseeability analysis eight years later in Ann M. The Ann M. case
involved a plaintiff who was raped by an unknown assailant inside a
192. See Ann M., 863 P.2d at 215-16.
193. See Isaacs, 695 P.2d at 655.
194. Id. at 661-62.
195. Id. at 662.
196. Id. at 662 n.8.
197. Id.
198. See Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400, 23 P.3d 1143, 1153 (Cal. 2001).
199. See, e.g., Nola M. v. Univ. of S. Cal., 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 97, 102 (Ct. App. 1993).
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large shopping mall.20 0 At trial, the plaintiff introduced evidence of a
lack of security guards, a broken "drop gate," the presence of "tran-
sients" on the premises, calls to police by employees afraid of persons
loitering on the premises, and prior misdemeanor sexual assaults in
the shopping center parking lot.201 There was no evidence of previous
violent assaults on the premises prior to the rape of the plaintiff.
20 2
In addressing whether the scope of a landowner's duty specifi-
cally included the provision of security guards, the court reiterated
the need to balance "the foreseeability of the harm against the burden
of the duty to be imposed."20 3 The court justified its "refinement" on
the need for a more concrete test capable of achieving more consis-
tent results.20 4 In reasoning that the flexibility of foreseeability relied
on in Isaacs was no longer a viable goal, the Ann M. court pointed to
the endemic and unpredictable nature of crime and the heavy burden
associated with the provision of security guards.205 Relying on the un-
certainty of deterring crime,206 the court held that "the requisite de-
gree of foreseeability [necessary to require the hiring of security
guards] rarely, if ever, can be proven in the absence of prior similar
incidents of violent crime on the landowner's premises."20 7 The court
did not elaborate on what factors a court is to use in determining
these temporal and similarity elements. In light of the Isaacs court's
concern over arbitrary distinctions between past and present crimes,
this is particularly troubling since it likely was intentional.
Based on the facts of the Ann M. case, the court held that the
violent criminal assault was not sufficiently foreseeable to impose a
duty to provide security guards.20 8 The court first addressed the ab-
sence of evidence that the owner of the shopping center had notice of
200. See Ann M. v. Pac. Plaza Shopping Ctr., 863 P.2d 207, 209-10 (Cal. 1993).
201. Id. at 210.
202. Id. at 216.
203. Id. at 215.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. See id.; Hollywood Boulevard Venture v. Superior Court, 172 Cal. Rptr. 528, 530
(Ct. App. 1981) (reasoning "[n]o one really knows why people commit crime, hence no
one really knows what is 'adequate' deterrence in any given situation" (citation omitted)).
207. Ann M., 863 P.2d at 215. In a footnote, the court quaified its holding by stating
that "[i ] t is possible that some other circumstances such as immediate proximity to a substan-
tially similar business establishment that has experienced violent crime on its premises
could provide the requisite degree of foreseeability." Id. at 215-16 n.7 (emphasis added).
Exactly what "other circumstances" qualify under this exception to the strict interpretation
of prior similar instances, or even if there are any such circumstances, has not yet been
resolved by the California Supreme Court.
208. Id. at 216.
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any prior similar incidents on the premises. 20 9 Although the plaintiff
alleged that there had been prior similar incidents, the court found
that there was no evidence that the plaintiff had notice of any such
incidents. 210 Although a landowner's duty includes a duty to exercise
reasonable care to discover that criminal acts are being, or are likely
to be, committed on the premises, 211 the defendant implemented a
standard practice of recording all violent crime and the record con-
tained no evidence of prior violent attacks.212 Therefore, the Ann M.
court clearly recognized the importance of interpreting the prior re-
quirement as an assurance of notice in order to provide for intelligent
decision making. Further, so long as the landowner instigates a rea-
sonable system to record the information, the absence of such infor-
mation is highly dispositive of notice under Ann M.
The court continued to discuss the similarity requirement by stat-
ing that the prior misdemeanor sexual assaults and robberies were not
similar enough to the instant rape to satisfy the prior similar incidents
test.21 3 The court drew a distinction between the lesser non-violent
crimes and the violent crime of rape. One explanation for this distinc-
tion along the level of violence inherent in the crime is that often
non-violent crimes may be deterred by less burdensome measures
than the provision of security guards. For example, in the case of rob-
bery it is possible that any lesser means, such as increased lighting,
security gates, or video cameras, would likely prevent the crime. In the
event of violent assaults, however, frequently the only effective deter-
rence is properly hired and trained security guards. Thus, since the
claimed duty involved the provision of security guards, absent prior
crimes that may require the defendant to hire security guards in order
to prevent future occurrences of those crimes, the defendant will not
have a duty to hire security guards.
The Ann M. court's failure to further elaborate on the prior and
similar requirements was not the only source of confusion following
the opinion. Confusion as to the scope and viability of the prior simi-
lar incidents test resulted from the incomplete opinion in this case. 214
Specifically, the Ann M. court left open at least three possible ways to
establish a landowner's duty to prevent third party crime: (1) proving
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. See Peterson v. S.F. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 685 P.2d 1193, 1197 (Cal. 1984).
212. See Ann M., 863 P.2d at 216.
213. Id.
214. See, e.g., Sharon P. v. Arman, Ltd., 989 P.2d 121 (Cal. 1999).
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prior similar incidents of violent crime on the premises; (2) proving
that the premises upon which the crime giving rise to the litigation
occurred was within "immediate proximity to a substantially similar
business establishment that has experienced violent crime on its prem-
ises;"' 215 and (3) proving that the premises upon which the crime giv-
ing rise to the litigation was "so inherently dangerous that, even in the
absence of prior similar incidents, providing security guards will fall
within the scope of a landowner's duty of care."216 Although the viabil-
ity of the second means of proving a duty to hire security guards has
yet to be resolved, the supreme court later addressed and rejected the
third possibility.
c. Sharon P. v. Arman, Ltd.
In Sharon P., the California Supreme Court reconsidered its previ-
ous dicta in Ann M. regarding the possibility that a premises classifica-
tion as "inherently dangerous" could impose a duty to provide security
guards absent proof of prior similar incidents on the premises. 217 In
Sharon P., the plaintiff was raped at gunpoint by an unknown assailant
in an underground commercial parking garage where she had parked
her car. 218 In the ten years preceding the attack during which the
landowner owned and controlled the parking lot, there was no record
of physical assaults or gun-related crime.219 There was, however, evi-
dence of seven armed robberies in the adjoining bank that was also
owned by the defendant.220 Despite the lack of prior similar incidents,
the plaintiff argued that the inherently dangerous nature of the prem-
ises provided the requisite foreseeability to support the imposition of
a duty to take reasonable measures to prevent her rape. 221
The court rejected the plaintiffs argument that underground
parking structures were inherently dangerous as a matter of law.
222
First, the court specifically rejected the argument "that all under-
ground parking lots, regardless of their location or individual physical
characteristics, are equally prone to violence such that they are inher-
ently dangerous."223 Second, the court noted the absence of facts sup-
215. Ann M., 863 P.2d at 215-16 & n.7 (emphasis added).
216. Id. at 216 n.8.
217. Sharon P., 989 P.2d at 124-25.
218. Id. at 123.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 124.
222. Id. at 127.
223. Id. (emphasis added).
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porting a conclusion that there is something inherent in
underground parking lots that distinguishes their safety from that of
above-ground parking lots or other types of commercial property gen-
erally. 224 Third, the court recognized that such a per se rule would
create "incongruous results."225 The inconsistency between the Ann
M. rule and the proposed per se rule was evidenced in the facts them-
selves: there were no reported incidents of crime on the premises and
only seven incidents of "dissimilar" crimes on the adjoining prem-
ises. 226 Providing security guards for the ten years leading up to the
instant sexual assault would have proven wasteful and would have
made landowners the "insurers of public safety." 227
Relying on the viability of the prior similar incidents test to accu-
rately account for foreseeability when the premises is arguably prone
to increased violent crime, the court again based its reasoning on no-
tions of law and economics. If the court were to abandon the prior
similar incidents test in these circumstances, then all commercial busi-
nesses that were deemed such an establishment would be forced to
make the determination whether to meet the duty of hiring and train-
ing security based not on an intelligent decision grounded in facts,
but upon generalized statistics. Whatever the landowner were to de-
cide in regard to such a significant burden, she would likely have to
pass on the cost of accident prevention (security) or accidents (liabil-
ity and insurance) to the customer. The cost of the services would
then become prohibitively expensive without any occurrence of prior
violent crime and no evidence that such events would ever occur.
Thus, the high cost of accident prevention is not close enough to a
decrease in the cost of accidents, and the sum total would be dispro-
portionately high.
By contrast, the prior similar incidents rule adequately accounts
for the nature of the establishment. By requiring the occurrence of a
prior violent crime, landowners and courts are no longer forced to
deal with the speculative occurrence of crime. Rather, they may make
intelligent and informed liability decisions knowing that the establish-
ment has already experienced crime. This reliance on prior criminal
conduct, overall, will reduce the waste that is inconsistent with an effi-
cient system of resource allocation. In order for this increased effi-
224. Id.
225. Id. at 129.
226. Id. at 129-30 (implicitly recognizing that the instant sexual assault was not suffi-
ciently similar to the armed bank robberies so as to impose a duty to hire security guards).
227. Id. at 130.
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ciency to occur, the cost of the first accident, which may not have
been prevented absent information gained from earlier examples of
crime on the premises, must not be greater than the cost of the bur-
den of providing security before the occurrence of the first violent
crime. Although this equation involves too many variables to be accu-
rately calculated, it is likely that the cost of one accident will not meet
the cost of hiring and training security multiplied by the unknown
variable of time (ten years in the case of Sharon P.). Thus, the ability of
the prior similar incidents test to allow for more concrete information
in intelligent decision making and to discourage wasteful conduct on
the part of landowners accounts for the court's rejection of the "inher-
ently dangerous" doctrine.
A final point addressed in the Sharon P. decision was whether
there was sufficient foreseeability to impose a duty to provide "less
burdensome" preventative measures, such as "adequate lighting" and
maintenance of previously installed security cameras. 228 The Sharon P.
court recognized that, because the scope of the duty required a bal-
ancing of the burden of the duty sought to be imposed against the
foreseeability of such third party conduct, a court may apply a some-
what "broader" concept of foreseeability where "minimal security mea-
sures are at issue."229 Under such a test, a prior nonassaultive third
party crime may provide the requisite foreseeability regarding subse-
quent assaults where "it would be reasonable to anticipate that a per-
son would be subject to violent attack if he or she were to be present
at an otherwise foreseeable crime on the premises or if he or she were
to interrupt such a crime in progress." 230 First, the Sharon P. court
questioned whether the proposed "minimal obligations". "would have
been effecting to protect against the type of violent assault that oc-
curred here."'2 3 1 From this skepticism of the efficacy of the proposed
measures, the Sharon P. court recognized that other courts properly
"rejected claims of abstract negligence pertaining to the lighting and
maintenance of property where no connection to the alleged injuries
was shown."23 2 Notwithstanding concerns of efficacy and proximate
cause, the Sharon P. court concluded that there was insufficient evi-
228. Id. at 130-33. The court questioned whether these proposed measures were actu-
ally less burdensome since the proper maintenance of surveillance cameras required hir-
ing and training persons to monitor the cameras and respond effectively when criminal
activity is observed. Id. at 130.
229. See id. at 131.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 130-31.
232. Id. at 131.
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dence of prior crimes under the "broader concept of foreseeability" to
impose a duty on the landowner. 233
The Sharon P. court's discussion of "minimal security" measures
remains consistent with efficient resource allocation. First, the court's
broader foreseeability analysis recognizes that foreseeability of subse-
quent third party crimes is not limited to the crime itself but also in-
cludes the foreseeable consequences of not taking efficient
preventative measures and allowing the prior crime to later occur. Al-
though the Sharon P. court discussed foreseeability in terms of a vic-
tim's presence at, or interruption of, a subsequent occurrence of the
prior crime, both the broader foreseeability analysis and the law and
economics interpretation of the prior similar incidents test define
foreseeable crimes as crimes that would likely not have occurred had
the landowner taken measures to prevent subsequent occurrences of
the prior crime itself. Second, the court, although careful to distin-
guish duty from proximate cause, recognized that the efficacy of the
proposed measure in preventing the subsequent crime was a proper
consideration in the context of the duty analysis. Thus, the Sharon P.
court recognized that foreseeability inheres a causal component dis-
tinct from proximate cause.
d. Saelzler v. Advanced Group
Although the court in Saelzler v. Advanced Group was concerned
solely with the issue of causation, the court's analysis is instructive of
the role of causation as it pertains to the duty analysis. 234 In Saelzler, a
female Federal Express employee was assaulted while attempting to
deliver a package to a resident of the defendant's apartment com-
plex. 23 5 Although the plaintiff recognized her assailants as the same
three young men she previously noticed loitering on the premises and
immediately outside a broken security gate, 236 the true identity of the
assailants was not known because the assailants alluded arrest by flee-
ing the scene of the assault. 237 The plaintiff alleged that the defend-
ants had actual notice of frequent, recurring criminal and gang
activity on the premises,238 that these prior third party violent crimes
included incidents of trespass, tampering with the security gates, sex-
233. Id. at 131-32.
234. Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400, 23 P.3d 1143, 1149 (Cal. 2001).
235. Id. at 1147.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
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ual assaults, and attempted and actual rapes,239 and that defendant
had previously undertaken providing security measures including fre-
quently repairing broken security gates and hiring night time roaming
security guards. 240 Further, the plaintiffs security expert opined that
the daytime assault would not have occurred had the defendants
hired full-time security and implemented a "more concerted effort to
keep gates repaired and closed."24 1
The trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary
judgment, finding that the plaintiff failed to establish that the defend-
ants' alleged breach was the proximate or legal cause of her assault. 242
Although the "overwhelming evidence" of prior incidents established
a duty for the defendant to provide increased security to prevent the
highly foreseeable assault, the court concluded that plaintiff failed to
establish a "'reasonably probable causal connection"' between the de-
fendants' breach and her injuries.2 43 In a divided decision, the Sec-
ond District Court of Appeal reversed. 244 Applying an "ordinary
experience" analysis, the Second District found "defendants' 'com-
plete absence of required security measures' by itself reasonably could
be deemed a contributing cause of any criminal activity in the
area."
245
The California Supreme Court granted review in order to con-
sider whether the plaintiff had established a prima facie case of causa-
tion sufficient to survive the defendant's motion for summary
judgment.246 The Saelzler court considered whether, assuming that the
defendants owed and breached a legal duty, the defendants' alleged
239. Id.
240. Id. at 1148.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. The court also held that defendants' failure to provide required security justi-
fied shifting the burden of proof to defendants to conclusively establish the absence of a
causal connection. Id.
246. Id. at 1145. Interestingly, the court stated its purpose in granting review in the
case was, in part, to "balance two important and competing policy concerns: society's inter-
est in compensating persons injured by another's negligent acts, and its reluctance to im-
pose unrealistic financial burdens on property owners conducting legitimate business
enterprises on their premises." Id. But see id. at 1158 (Werdeger,J., dissenting) (criticizing
the majority's discussion of policy, a consideration reserved for the duty analysis, in its
analysis of the "factual" inquiry as to causation).
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negligence was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiffs injuries. 247
In determining when a defendant's alleged negligence is a substantial
factor contributing to the plaintiffs injuries, the court noted that the
"'mere possibility of such causation is not enough.' "248 The plaintiff
must actually prove by more than mere speculation or possibility that
"it was more probable than not" that the proposed duty would have
prevented the injury-causing conduct. 249 In the case, because the
plaintiff admitted that she could not prove the identity of her assail-
ants, and thus whether they were authorized residents or unautho-
rized trespassers, neither the plaintiffs allegation nor her expert's
"speculative opinion" established that maintaining the security gates
and hiring daytime security guards was a substantial factor in causing
her injuries.250 Thus, the Saelzler court held that the plaintiff failed to
introduce specific facts sufficient to meet her burden in opposing
summary judgment.251
The Saelzler court was equally unpersuaded by the plaintiffs reli-
ance on a "rule of common sense" causation.252 First, the court re-
jected the plaintiffs argument that a footnote in Isaacs supported her
argument that an affirmative finding of foreseeability establishes the
element of causation. 253 Instead, the court stated:
We did not intend to suggest in Isaacs that a general finding of the foresee-
ability of some kind of future injury or assault on the premises inevitably
establishes that the defendant's omission caused plaintiffs own injuries.
Actual causation is an entirely separate and independent element of the tort
of negligence.25 4
Second, the Saelzler court rejected the plaintiffs argument that the
supreme court should adopt a practical approach to the causation is-
sue, whereby common sense and experience should lead one to con-
clude that the complete absence of required security measures is
necessarily a contributing cause.255 The court reasoned that it would
247. Id. at 1149-54. The court actually reasons that "by reason of the prior criminal
assaults and incidents on the premises, defendants may have owed a duty to provide a
reasonable degree of security to persons entering them." Id. at 1151.
248. Id. at 1151 (quoting KEETON, supra note 24, at § 41) (footnotes omitted).
249. See id. at 1152.
250. Id. at 1151-52.
251. Id. at 1155.
252. Id. at 1153.
253. Id. at 1152-53 (citing Isaacs v. Huntington Mem'l Hosp., 695 P.2d 653, 663 n.8
(Cal. 1985) (finding that an affirmative finding of foreseeability during the duty analysis
would establish a "close connection" between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's
injuries)).
254. Id. at 1153.
255. Id.
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be grossly unfair "to adopt a rule of common sense that seemingly
would prevent summary judgment on the causation issue in every case
in which the defendant failed to adopt increased security measures of
some kind."256 The plaintiff, the court stated, bears the burden of
proving a substantial link or nexus between omission and injury, and
the injury itself does not constitute this missing link. 257
The Saelzler court's review of the causation element on a motion
for summary judgment is consistent with an efficient resource alloca-
tion interpretation of the prior similar incidents test. Although the
Saelzler court recognized that there was a similarity between the de-
fendants' conduct and the plaintiffs harm in both the causation and
duty elements, it was careful to distinguish the degree of certainty of
the connection between the defendants' conduct and plaintiffs actual
injury in the context of causation and the defendants' conduct and
the foreseeability of the plaintiff's harm in the context of a duty.
e. Wiener v. Southcoast Childcare Ctrs., Inc.
In 2004 the California Supreme Court considered whether a
child care center and its property owner owed a duty to the parents of
two children killed by a man who deliberately drove his car through a
fence surrounding the center's premises. 258 In Wiener, the defendants
owned and operated a childcare center located on a busy street cor-
ner.2 59 The center's playground was adjacent to the sidewalk and
street and was surrounded by a four-foot-high chain link fence. 260 One
afternoon, a man intentionally drove his car "through the fence, onto
the playground, and into a group of children," killing two and injur-
ing several others.261 The assailant was arrested, convicted of first de-
gree murder, and sentenced to life without parole.262 Although
neither the childcare center nor the premises had ever before been
the target of a violent third party crime before the childcare center
operated the premises, a few noninjury traffic accidents happened
near the premises. 263 Of particular relevance to the Wiener court's
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Wiener v. Southcoast Childcare Ctrs., 88 P.3d 517 (Cal. 2004).
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 519-20.
262. Id. at 520.
263. Id.
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analysis was that only one freak accident occurred in which a vehicle
went through the fence, but nobody on the premises was injured.264
The plaintiffs alleged that a sturdier barrier would have pre-
vented the assailant's car from entering the playground and killing
the children.265 The defendants each moved for summary judgment,
contending that the crime was a "wholly unforeseeable" criminal act
under Ann M.266 The defendants argued that neither defendant had
notice of any prior similar acts that would place it on notice of a need
for increased security.267 They further argued that, even if they had
notice of the prior incident, it was not a similar incident that would
make the subsequent crime foreseeable. 268 In opposition to the sum-
mary judgment motions, the plaintiffs asserted that the defendants
owed a duty as a matter of law to the plaintiffs because it was foresee-
able that any vehicle could leave the road and strike the playground
fence.269 The plaintiffs argued that it did not matter whether the
driver of the vehicle that killed the children acted negligently or with
criminal intent because the risk of harm from an unsafe fence was the
same. 270 The trial court granted summary judgment for the defend-
ants after finding that the "plaintiffs failed to present evidence of
prior similar incidents of violent crime or criminal acts and therefore
failed to show defendants owed a duty to prevent [the subsequent
third party crime] ."271 The court of appeal reversed, holding that "an
'errant' motorist careening through the fence accidentally was a fore-
seeable event."272
The California Supreme Court granted review to determine
whether the prior automobile accident was sufficiently similar to the
subsequent criminal incident to make the latter foreseeable, and thus
impose a duty as a matter of law.273 The Wiener court rejected the
plaintiffs' argument that the similarity requirement should be inter-
preted in terms of "'the kind of harm' . . . suffered rather than the
criminal act itself."274 Under such a flawed analysis the nature of the
harm was not dependent on the driver's criminal state of mind such
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 521.
269. Id. at 520.
270. Id. at 520-21.
271. Id. at 521.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 521-25.
274. Id. at 523.
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that "prior accidents made foreseeable any future occasions of cars
crashing through the fence." 275 The Wiener court reasoned that such a
test "did not give due consideration to the criminal nature of [the]
injury-producing act," and thus created a duty test that is far too
broad.276 While the precise details of the third party's actions are not
significant in an ordinary negligence action, 277 the court asserted that
third party criminal acts are analyzed differently from ordinary negli-
gence and, as such, courts require a heightened sense of foreseeability
as provided by prior similar incidents.278 This distinction is based on
the difficulty in predicting when a criminal might strike and the diffi-
culty in deterring third party crime generally. Applying the Ann M.
balancing test to the facts in the present case, the Wiener court con-
cluded that the defendants owed no duty to plaintiffs because the
driver's brutal criminal act was dissimilar and thus unforeseeable. 279
Absent "prior similar criminal acts, or even any indication of prior crimi-
nal acts or intrusions of any type in the surrounding businesses, defendants
here could not have been expected to create a fortress."280
The Wiener court held that foreseeability of a third party criminal
act requires the occurrence of a prior similar criminal act.281 The
court's rejection of a "type of harm" interpretation of the similarity
requirement is consistent with efficient resource allocation. If the
court had accepted the proposed "type of harm" interpretation, a
landowner would be responsible for deterring third party criminal
conduct that might cause the same type of harm that a prior accident
previously caused. 282 The landowner, however, would have neither no-
tice of the type of criminal conduct that might cause such harm nor
knowledge of the measures that might prevent it. Yet in order to meet
its duty and avoid civil liability, it is likely that the landowner would
need to take measures to prevent almost all types of third party crimi-
nal acts. Because of the extremely high cost of such preventative mea-
sures, it is likely that the landowner would not take any measures at
all. Focusing on the criminal intent of the third party narrows the req-
uisite foreseeability analysis and requires foreseeability to be propor-
275. Id. at 524.
276. Id.
277. Id. (citing Robison v. Six Flags Theme Parks, Inc., 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d 838, 841 (Ct.
App. 1998)).
278. Id.
279. Id. at 525.
280. Id. (emphasis added).
281. Id.
282. See id. at 523-24.
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tionate to the burden incurred in preventing subsequent criminal
acts. By requiring a prior crime as a threshold, the landowner is
placed in a position of better access to relevant information and may
then decide how best to prevent similar incidents. Although the oc-
currence of a prior accident arguably places the landowner in a posi-
tion of better access to information of the type of foreseeable injuries,
this information is not relevant in a prevention context. Distinguish-
ing crimes from ordinary negligence promotes efficient resource allo-
cation by ensuring that foreseeability remains proportionate to the
high burden of deterring third party crime.
B. Application of the Revised Prior Similar Incidents Test to the
Issue Before the Delgado Court
The issue currently before the California Supreme Court in Del-
gado is whether the scope of the prior similar incidents test accounts
for those instances where a landowner voluntarily provides security
guards.283 In addressing this issue, the court should first apply the re-
vised prior similar incidents test to the facts before it to determine
whether the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty. Then the court may
address the scope of the revised prior similar incidents test.
1. Does Defendant Trax's Voluntary Provision of Security Guards
Remove the Duty Analysis from the Scope of the
Refined Prior Similar Incidents Test?
In Delgado v. Trax Bar & Grill, the Fifth District held that the vol-
untary provision of security guards does not change the foreseeability
analysis from the prior similar incidents test.284 The law and econom-
ics theory requires that the decision to voluntarily provide security
guards be analyzed in terms of efficient resource allocation. Accepting
the fact that hiring, training, and retaining security guards will never
amount to a trivial burden, a landowner must realize that there is
some incentive to taking such precautions. In the instances where
there has been no prior criminal conduct on the premises whatsoever,
283. See CAL. APPELLATE COURTS, CASE SUMMARY, supra note 3. This issue is presently the
subject of a current split between two California Courts of Appeal. Compare Delgado v. Trax
Bar & Grill, 134 Cal. Rptr. 2d 548 (Ct. App. 2003) (holding that the provision of security
guards in the absence of prior similar incidents does not amount to an assumption of a
duty to do so with reasonable care), with Mata v. Mata, 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 141 (Ct. App.
2003) (holding that landowners provision of security guards made the prior similar inci-
dents test inapposite because the landowner had already assumed a duty to reasonably hire
and train those security guards).
284. Delgado, 134 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 552.
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it is fair to assume that the landowner's motivation in so doing is not
the fear of ensuing civil liability, but rather the realization that the loss
of business that would result from such a criminal assault would ex-
ceed the cost of providing security.285 In the rational decision maker
model, this is the only incentive that would be necessary since the
expenditure of resources to provide security implies the responsibility
to do so adequately. If a landowner spends money to provide security
to prevent the loss of business incidental to the occurrence of a crime,
then she would be in the best position to realize that the provision of
inadequate security would result not only in the waste of those re-
sources associated with training, but also in the lost business that she
sought to prevent in the first place.
In contrast, holding that the voluntary provision of security
guards would be, in many instances, the only way to incur liability,
would undermine the incentive-based system. Whereas a business
owner has the incentive to provide security regardless of a duty to do
so where she determines that crime is probable, or even foreseeable
under the totality of the circumstances, declaring that she has as-
sumed a duty by doing so would not incentivize further investment in
the training of security to ensure that it is never inadequate. Rather, it
merely incentivizes the complete absence of security guards despite
the landowner's realization that crime is likely. This is because the
cost of not hiring security and suffering any consequential loss to busi-
ness from a criminal attack on the premises will, on average, be less
expensive than the sum total of hiring and training security, the con-
sequential loss in business resulting from the criminal attack, the cost
of litigating the adequacy of the security guards, and the possible civil
damages if that security was found to be inadequate.
Clearly, when a rule is proven to have a result opposite to its de-
sired effect through the application of an incentive-based interpreta-
tion, that rule must be abandoned. If the unsound legal reasoning
offered in support of abandoning the prior similar incidents test is not
285. It is possible that the landowner is in fact providing security not out of a motiva-
tion to retain current business, but as a means of inducing new business through the ap-
pearance of secure premises. This scenario, however, would not fall within the intended
policy of deterrence or the interpretive framework of law and economics since the land-
owner is concerned not with the result of such measures, but only the resulting appear-
ance. These scenarios are more appropriately analyzed under the contracts doctrines of
reliance and quasi contracts, where the California courts have held that a breach in the
promise to provide adequate security may support an imposition of liability. See Avila v.
Jado Props., Inc., 5 Cal. Rptr. 3d 141, 149 (Ct. App. 2003). The California Supreme Court
has granted review in this case. Avila v. Jado Props., Inc., 82 P.3d 746 (Cal. 2004).
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itself reason enough to maintain a consistent liability rule in situations
where the landowner voluntarily provided security, the confusion inci-
dental to the adoption of a novel liability rule should provide the addi-
tional reason required. Efficient resource allocation is dependent
upon clear and predictable models of liability. The recognition of an
exception to the rule creates ambiguity and uncertainty in the field.
Landowners would again be uncertain of when their duty commenced
and what the scope of that duty would be. Insurers would be reluctant
to insure landowners who hired security guards just as they would be
reluctant to insure landowners who did not. Thus, landowners would
either be forced out of business by large liability insurance costs or
would self-insure by charging high prices on goods in order to pass
the cost of accident prevention onto their customers. They would also
risk a loss of clientele sufficient to close business operations. In the
end, the increased price of consumer goods would create a highly
inefficient market wherein intrinsic value would no longer have a
meaningful designation.
Therefore, the voluntary provision of security guards should not
amount to an assumption of a duty to provide security guards. The
duty analysis under these circumstances is properly subject to the re-
vised prior similar incidents test. The ability of law and economics to
further efficient resource allocation in premises security litigation
lends well to the interests implicated in the voluntary provision of se-
curity guards. Treating the voluntary provision of security guards as an
assumption of a duty is an inefficient allocation of resources and
should rarely impose a duty for the landowner to prevent violent third
party criminal assaults absent prior similar incidents of violent crime
on the premises.
2. Was the Assualt on Delgado Sufficiently Foreseeable Under the
Refined Prior Similar Incidents Test?
Having determined that the voluntary provision of security
guards does not fall outside the scope of the foreseeability analysis of
Ann M., as part of its de novo review, the California Supreme Court
should apply the revised prior incidents test in considering whether
the assault on Delgado was unforeseeable as a matter of law.
28 6
286. The analysis is as follows: (1) Was there a prior criminal incident on the prem-
ises?; (2) If a prior criminal incident occurred on the premises, is taking reasonable mea-
sure to hire and train security guards, the most efficient, effective accident-avoiding
measure?; (3) If reasonable security guards is the most efficient measure of effectively
preventing the prior crime, is it more efficient to hire and train security guards or to allow
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The first inquiry is whether there was a prior third party violent
criminal act on the premises. The occurrence of the previous "ordi-
nary 'bar fights"' on the premises is undisputed. 287 These prior as-
saults are sufficient to establish foreseeability commensurate with a
duty for Trax to prevent future occurrences of these bar fights. Cer-
tainly if the "similar" requirement is to mean anything, it must include
subsequent criminal conduct that is identical to the prior third party
crime.
The second inquiry is whether the most cost-efficient means of
preventing future occurrences of identical crimes included hiring se-
curity guards. A "bar fight" is a violent criminal act, and the court has
long recognized that this type of conduct often requires hiring and
training of security personnel to effectively prevent future occur-
rences.288 Thus, Trax owed a duty to hire security guards based on
prior violent crime on the premises.
The landowner must consider whether it is more efficient to as-
sume the most effective measure of preventing the crime or to absorb
the cost of liability and obtain insurance. Here, Trax was in the best
position to make this informed, rational decision. Thus, where it is
clear that the landowner decided to hire security guards based on past
crimes and in order to prevent future identical crimes, then it should
be assumed that it was in fact more efficient to meet the duty of pro-
viding security guards than absorb liability.
The final inquiry is whether the previous duty to hire security
guards could have prevented the occurrence of the subsequent crime
at issue. 289 Since Trax already owed a duty to provide security guards,
reducing the overall cost of accidents without increasing the related
burden increases the efficiency of the system. Joseph's assault of Del-
gado was more than an "ordinary 'bar fight,' "290 but this change from
future occurrences of the prior crime?; and (4) If it is more efficient to take reasonable
measures to hire and train security guards, then the landlord will have a duty to prevent all
subsequent crimes that could have been prevented if the landlord reasonably hired and
trained security guards. See supra Part IV.A.2.
287. Trax does not dispute that it had experienced ordinary bar fights on its premises
and knew of them. See Delgado, 134 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 551. In fact, it took affirmative measures
of hiring and training security guards in part to prevent frequent bar fights. Id. at 550.
Therefore, the "prior" requirement is satisfied, and the Fifth District and the defendant
did not contend otherwise. Id. at 551.
288. Cf Sharon P. v. Arman, Ltd., 989 P.2d 121, 130 (Cal. 1999) (stating that it was
unlikely that security measures less than hiring a security guard could have prevented the
violent crime).
289. See supra Part IV.A.2.
290. Delgado, 134 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 551.
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an ordinary to an exceptional bar fight does not in itself limit the duty to
prevent subsequent crimes that are not identical to the prior crime. If
there were any means of preventing Joseph from assaulting Delgado,
it would almost certainly require Trax to have provided numerous se-
curity guards-a very high burden. 291 Therefore, the crimes were suf-
ficiently similar to satisfy the revised prior similar incidents test and
establish the requisite foreseeability to impose a duty on Trax to have
prevented the gang assault.
Conclusion
The California Supreme Court's decision to adopt the prior simi-
lar incidents test in Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center is supported
by efficient resource allocation. The court's failure, however, to define
the necessary elements of the test in terms of efficient resource alloca-
tion has caused confusion as to the efficacy and scope of the test over
the past decade. By returning to the initial economic motivations be-
hind the court's decision to adopt the test, the prior and similar ele-
ments may be coherently defined in a manner that effectuates the
desired efficiency. This coherence also provides a consistent applica-
tion of the test necessary to the court's definition of the scope and
boundaries of the test. With this scope properly defined in terms of
efficiency, it becomes clear that the voluntary provision of security
guards is not subject to a different foreseeability analysis than the
prior similar incidents test. Therefore, in the absence of prior similar
incidents on the premises, a landowner who voluntarily provides se-
curity guards does not assume a duty to take reasonable measures to
protect persons upon the premises from third party criminal acts.
291. Under this refined test it is, of course, possible that there would never be enough
foreseeability to provide many security guards or that the criminal attack could never be
prevented without police intervention.
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